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Abstract  
This thesis intends to develop application-level access control models to address several major 
security issues in enterprise environments.  The first goal is to provide simple and efficient 
authorization specifications to reduce the complexity of security management.  The second goal is 
to provide dynamic access control for Web service applications.  The third goal is to provide an 
access control framework for Semantic Web services.   
In this thesis, an Authorization-Function-Based Role-based Access Control (FB-RBAC) 
model is proposed for controlling enterprise systems at the application level.  The unique features 
of the proposed model are authorization-function-based access control and constraint-based fine-
grained access control.  This model significantly simplifies the management of an access control 
system by adopting roles and authorization-functions in authorization specifications.   An 
extension of FB-RBAC, Extended FB-RBAC (ERBAC), is applied to Web service applications.  
New features such as credential-based access control and dynamic role assignment are added to 
FB-RBAC in order to address user heterogeneity and dynamicity in the Web environment.  The 
proposed ERBAC model is then extended to support Semantic Web services.  Each component of 
the ERBAC model is described by security ontologies.  These correlated security ontologies are 
 2 
integrated with Semantic Web services to form a complete ontology network.  Ontology-based 
role assignment is facilitated so that security information can be queries and discovered through a 
network of ontologies.     
 3 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 General Background 
Large commercial organizations rely on enterprise information systems to manage their daily 
operations.  A contemporary enterprise system is often distributed in nature. It brings together 
heterogeneous and autonomous applications from different locations to deliver specific business 
functions to end users and to other business applications [COET03, FRAN03].  These individual 
systems are written in different languages, run on various platforms, and follow a diversity of 
security models.  A typical enterprise system is usually implemented in a Client/Server fashion 
and consists of client workstations and mainframe server [PERK03].  The application’s 
presentation and business logic resides in the client tier, and its database management logic 
resides in the server tier [MCGO03].  A middle tier (enterprise tier) may be added in between the 
client tier and the server tier to encapsulate business logic; this is called the three-tier architecture 
[EDEL94].  In the three-tier architecture, the client tier manages the user interface and data 
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presentation only, and the mainframe tier becomes the database tier.  Sometimes, the client tier is 
called the front end, and the database tier the back end [FRAN03].                       
To provide more interoperability among different sectors of a company, enterprise systems 
are now supported by Web technologies [COET03].  Web service is a new service paradigm 
established on top of existing Web technologies such as XML and HTTP, and is designed to 
support business integration in commercial organizations [WSAC].  It may be implemented in the 
middle tier or in a separate tier: a Web tier that resides between the client tier and the enterprise 
tier.  Web services have many advantages over traditional communication approaches [BARR03, 
ERL04]. They can help companies connect standalone computer systems and get isolated 
applications to share information.  Through Web services heterogeneous systems can interact 
with each other easily and effectively.  Web services are easy to deploy and they do not require 
changes to the existing code and software. Web services are also platform-independent and 
programming-language-independent, so that they can be implemented in a variety of operating 
systems and programming environments.   
However, Web services also face some major problems. One of them is semantic discrepancy.  
Data information in the Web environment is described in different ways due to the diversity of 
hardware platforms, programming languages and network protocols [AGAR04a, AGAR04b].  
This so called semantic discrepancy has prevented Web-based information and services become 
accessible and understandable to a variety of agents and applications [CHEN03, GRIM04].  
Recent development in the Semantic Web has resolved this problem by providing a common 
semantic framework to describe the content of Web pages as well as the properties and the 
capabilities of Web services [DENK03, SEMA].  The Semantic Web is the idea of the inventor of 
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World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee, and has been developed by the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) as part of the effort to standardize Web-related technologies and systems 
[SEMA].  As a part of the semantic Web development, Semantic Web services are supported by 
ontologies and ontology-based languages like OWL [CHEN03, OWLa].  This allows Web 
resources and services to be queried and discovered automatically [DENK03].   In the meantime, 
research on Semantic Web service is still at its early stage, and its security aspects have yet to be 
extensively investigated.      
The above-mentioned systems and services are all designed to serve particular groups of 
users.  To protect them from unauthorized access, access control is required.   Access control can 
be applied to different parts of an enterprise system, such as databases, operating systems, 
network communication and services, as well as business functions provided by enterprise system 
[BISH05].  Access control mechanisms for protecting entire enterprise systems are best 
implemented in the middle-tier of a three-tier client/server system.  This is so because that 
preserves the autonomy of participating server tier applications whose existing access control 
systems are then not affected by enterprise-level access control mechanisms [BIDA98, VIME96].  
In addition, access control mechanisms implemented at the enterprise-level will be independent of 
front-end user interface applications and back-end systems.  Access control involves several 
important tasks [AMOR94, CAST94].  The first one is to identify what needs to be protected and 
in what way it should be protected.  For example, it needs to know whether it is a database, file, 
business function or communication channel that the system wants to protect.   The second task is 
to identify who is allowed to access the system.  Traditionally, a user of a system is a human.  In a 
broader sense, however, a user can also be a process, an application or a Web service.  This 
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makes user administration more complicated.  Thirdly, access control rules need to be established.  
This includes rules that determine which user can access particular resources or data, and what 
users can or cannot do with the resources or data, for example a user may be given the privilege 
to view a file but not to modify it.  In addition, some environmental factors may also be included 
in the access control rules [ALKA02, BERT01c, BERT05, BHAT04b].  For example, the system 
may only be accessible during normal working hours (9am-5pm), or the system is available only 
for a certain number of users at a time.  The study of access control will be centred on these three 
aspects.   
1.2 Problem Statement  
An enterprise system consists of multiple applications, resources from heterogeneous and 
autonomous sources [COET03, FRAN03].  Access control of the enterprise system involves 
many different aspects.  The existing access control models are mainly designed for database or 
operating systems and are not suitable for application-level access control.   These models are 
required to specify the protection status of individual data items with different access types.  
Whereas, at the application level, we only need to consider which functions/services of an 
application are requested/accessed, regardless of what data items or resources are involved.   
Therefore, it is necessary to develop application-level access control models to address security 
issues in enterprise environments.  
One of the concerning issues is the large number of users and resources present in enterprise 
systems [ALKA02].   These users and resources are highly diversified.  Traditional access control 
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systems usually rely on user identities to carry out authentication and authorization.  As the 
number of users increases, it becomes difficult to specify and administer them against a large 
number of protected resources.  A major challenge to the security management of an access 
control system is to specify authorizations that involve heterogeneous users and resources in a 
simple and efficient manner. 
Secondly, providing access control to Web services is a challenging issue [DENK03].  The 
traditional identity-based access control paradigm does not suit a highly distributed and 
diversified Web environment where the attributes and properties of individual users and the 
environmental conditions (e.g. system load) change continuously [ALKA02].  It is necessary to 
capture and consider these dynamic factors when making access control decisions [BHAT03a, 
BHAT03b].   
The Semantic Web has been developed to facilitate knowledge sharing and automatic service 
discovery.  Semantic Web services are described by ontologies like DAML-S or OWL-S [OWL-
S].  They provide common machine-interpretable semantics that allow services specified in such 
semantics to be queried and discovered automatically [SEMA].  However, research on providing 
security for the Semantic Web is still at its early stage.  A Semantic Web compatible security 
framework is then required to facilitate security integration and to provide automated access 
control ability for Semantic Web services.  
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1.3 Aims and Approaches 
Access control covers a broad spectrum of computer technologies.  In this thesis, our aim is 
to provide access control at the application level that protects unauthorized access to business 
functions and services of general enterprise systems.  An application-level access control model, 
Authorization-function-based access control (FB-RBAC) model, is proposed for this purpose.  
This model is implemented in the middle-tier of an enterprise system to complement the security 
infrastructure located at the back-end of the system.   An important objective of this research is to 
simplify security administration and specification.  An expressive security specification, 
Authorization-function, are proposed, that are adaptable to access control at the application level.  
At the same time, the model needs to support a wide range of security policies, which is an 
essential requirement for a successful access control model.  Access control policies may be 
specified in varying granularity to support different access control scenarios.  Some of the 
existing access control techniques, such as content-based access control and constraint-based 
access control will be applied and extended to support different types of security policies.  
Furthermore, since many of the enterprise systems are Web-based, the proposed model also needs 
to consider access control requirements in a Web environment.  The proposed model needs to 
provide dynamic access control capturing a variety of security aspects, such as user capabilities 
(specifies what users can do), external factors (e.g. time, location, system status) and predefined 
access control policies (who can access what resources) in Web environment.     Besides, our 
research also considers the development of the Semantic Web.   As the Semantic Web is 
described by ontologies, this thesis intends to establish a formal access control framework to 
represent security related concepts using ontologies.  The ontology-based access control 
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framework will allow security services to be in line with the development of Semantic Web.   
Integration of security ontologies with the Semantic Web can provide sophisticated reasoning 
ability through a network of ontologies. 
1.4 Summary of Contributions 
The proposed model provides overall access control for business functions and services of an 
integrated enterprise system. It is especially designed for application-level access control and for 
avoiding the complexity at the level of individual data items as practiced in database security.  It 
significantly simplifies the security management of an enterprise system by providing a new form 
of permission: authorization-function.  An authorization-function is more efficient and expressive 
than existing techniques for application-level authorization specifications.  In addition, the 
proposed model is capable of supporting a variety of security policies for different access control 
scenarios.  An extension of this model is applied to Web service applications.  This extension 
provides dynamic access control to address the problem of heterogeneity and dynamicity of users, 
system resources and environmental conditions in the Web environment.   By allowing access 
control to be dynamic, access control decisions can be synchronized with continuously changing 
security conditions.  As a result, this model will be adaptable to the surrounding environment.  
Moreover, our research provides access control for the newly developed Semantic Web service.  
The proposed ontology-based access control framework provides formal semantics for security 
concepts and security policies.  Such a framework can be easily integrated with Semantic Web 
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services to provide automatic reasoning ability for querying and discovering security-related 
information.       
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 introduces terms and concepts that are used in later chapters.  Two well-known 
security models, Access Control Matrix (ACM) and Role-based Access Control (RBAC) will be 
discussed in detail. 
In chapter 3, an Authorization-function-based access control (FB-RBAC) model is proposed 
for enterprise systems.  We will discuss how this model can support efficient security 
management and a variety of access control policies at the application level.   
In chapter 4, an access control model is proposed for Web services.  This model extends FB-
RBAC from chapter 3 with a range of access control techniques like credential-based access 
control and constraint-based access control.  This extended model (ERBAC) facilitates dynamic 
access control decision making according to a range of internal and external factors. 
In chapter 5, an ontology-based access control model (OB-ERBAC) is proposed to support 
Semantic Web services.   Ontology, a semantic description technique used in the Semantic Web, 
is applied to ERBAC described in chapter 4.  A bookstore example is used to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the OB-ERBAC model.  
Chapter 6 summarizes the major results of the thesis, and outlines the research contribution.   
Some future research topics are also mentioned. 
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Chapter 2  
Background 
This chapter will introduce the main security concepts and security terminologies used in later 
chapters.  Since this thesis is aimed at providing access control for enterprise systems, access 
control will be the main focus of the review.  Some popular access control policies, access control 
mechanisms and access control policy management models will be analysed.  A summary of the 
access control requirements for enterprise systems is provided at the end of the chapter.   
2.1 Security Concepts and Terminologies 
2.1.1 Security in General 
The basic requirements of computer security are to satisfy the following six goals: 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, privacy, authenticity and non-repudiation.    Confidentiality 
prevents data from being seen by unauthorized parties. Integrity prevents unauthorized changes to 
data or resources. Availability refers to the ability to use the information or resource desired.  
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Privacy means information given by a user should only be used for the purpose it was given.  
Authentication is to prove whether the information given by a user is genuine.  Non-repudiation 
means the sender of a message cannot deny the transmission.  These goals are realized through 
security policies and security mechanisms.  Security policies describe what is allowed and what is 
not allowed by using mathematical expressions.  They provide high-level guidelines for design 
and management of an authorization system [FERN89].  A particular policy or set of policies may 
be represented by a security model [GOLL1999].  A security model provides high-level guidance 
towards the implementation of a security system [CAST94].  A security mechanism is a method, 
tool, or procedure for enforcing a security policy [GOLL1999].   Specific mechanisms include 
encryption, digital signature, access control, message authentication codes and authentication 
exchange. There are three different types of security mechanisms [AMOR94, CAST94]. 
Prevention mechanisms perform access control, detection mechanisms carry out auditing and 
intrusion detection and tolerance mechanisms ensure practicality. Prevention or access control is 
fundamental to the proper operation of a security system.     
2.1.2 Access Control  
The main objective of the thesis is to provide access control for enterprise-wide systems.  The 
goal of access control is to protect enterprise systems from unauthorized access.  Access control 
provides a set of policies and mechanisms that permit authorized subjects to access protected 
resources [BISH05]. Our review will focus on access control mechanisms and access control 
policies.  An access control mechanism is based on three types of information: subject, object and 
access mode.  Subjects are active entities of the system who request to access protected resources. 
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Objects are passive entities of the system that represent resources to be protected.  Access modes 
(or access types, operations) represent the types of access that subjects can exercise on objects.  
These three types of information are used to describe the permission for a subject to access a 
particular object in a given access mode at a particular time in the access control process.  This 
permission is called authorization.  Figure 2.1 represents the relationship between the basic 
elements of a security model. 
 
Figure 2.1 Basic Elements of a Security Model 
Access control is usually performed through a device called a reference monitor which grants 
or denies access.  A reference monitor evaluates an access request based on access control 
policies and ultimately makes a decision whether access is granted, denied or undecidable.  A 
typical access control system is illustrated in Figure 2.2: 
Security Subject Security Object 
Authorization 
Access Type 
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Figure 2.2 A Typical Access Control System 
2.2 Access Control Policy Management Models 
2.2.1 Access Control Matrix  
One of the classic security models used in both operating systems and database systems is the 
Access Control Matrix (ACM) [HARR76].  An ACM is shown in Table 2.1.  In ACM, the 
authorization state can be described as a triple (S, O, A) where S represents the subject, O 
represents the object and A is the access mode.  The matrix rows represent the subjects, the 
columns represent the objects, and the entry of A[s,o] stores the access modes.  Traditionally, the 
main task of access control is to protect files and databases, and typical access modes are Read 
(R), Write (W), Delete (D) and Create (C).    
Reference Monitor 
(Access Control 
Mechanisms) 
 
access request 
granted 
denied 
undecidable 
Access control 
policies and rules 
Subject 
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Subject\Object O1 O2 ……… Om 
S1 A[S1, O1] A[S1, O2]  A[S1, Om] 
S2 A[S2, O1] A[S2, O2]  A[S2, Om] 
……     
Sn A[Sn, O1] A[Sn, O2]  A[Sn, Om] 
Table 2.1 Access Control Matrix 
Every request from a subject S to access an object O in a given mode M is determined by the 
corresponding entry A[S, O] in the ACM.  The request is granted if M can be found in A[S,O].  
However, storing the full matrix as a two-dimensional array is inefficient since many of the 
entries may be empty and some subjects/objects can be inactive [CAST94].  An alternative 
solution is to store the ACM by rows or columns.  An Access Control List (ACL) stores 
authorizations by columns. It links each object with its associated subjects and their rights on the 
object.  A Capability List (CL) stores authorizations by rows.  It specifies the capability of each 
subject by identifying the associated objects and the types of access exercised on the object.  We 
provide an example below (Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3) to show how access control information can 
be stored in ACM, ACL and CL. 
Subject\Object O1 O2 
S1 R, W R 
S2 R  
S3  R, W, M 
Table 2.2 An Example of an Access Control Matrix 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 16 
 
Figure 2.3 Access Control Matrix (ACM) Implementations: Access Control List (ACL) and 
Capability List (CL) 
In the CL and ACL representations, the empty entries of the matrix are not stored (refer to 
Figure 2.3).  Hence, the number of entries in the access control matrix can be reduced 
significantly when there are large numbers of subjects and objects.   
An ACM can be extended by adding conditions to the access modes [CAST94].  Possible 
conditions are: 
● Data-dependent conditions, specifying constraints on the value of the accessed data.   
● Time-dependent conditions, specifying constraints on the time an access can take place.  
● Context-dependent conditions, specifying constraints on combinations of data which can be 
accessed. E.g. a subject may be able to read “employee name” and “employee salary” 
separately, but not when they are associated pairs “name-salary”. 
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● History-dependent conditions, specifying constraints dependent on previously performed 
accesses. 
The access control matrix model is the most precise model for describing authorization states 
[BISH05].  Many models have been developed on top of the access control matrix model.  
However, since the ACM is mainly used to control access to data or resources, it may not be the 
best solution to describe application-level access control. We will discuss this issue in chapter 3.   
2.2.2 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) 
Access control policies can be represented by a variety of models according to their 
characteristics [AMOR94].  Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) are two basic types of access control models [JOSH01].  DAC allows owners of objects to 
control the granting of access rights.  It bases access rights on the identity of the subjects and 
objects involved.  MAC uses centralized control to grant or deny access rights, and individual 
users cannot alter those rights, access rights are based on the classification of subjects and objects 
in the system.  Compared to DAC, MAC has high security assertions, which makes it less flexible 
than DAC.  These two access control mechanisms are used in different situations: DAC is 
adopted by many commercial applications; whereas MAC is mostly used by government and 
military applications [CLAR87, FERR92]. 
2.2.3 Role-based Access Control 
Access control of shared information has traditionally been performed by access control lists 
or capability lists [CAST94].  However, they are inadequate for addressing large number of 
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subjects and objects presented in heterogeneous and distributed enterprise environments.  In the 
early 1990s, role-based access control (RBAC) [FERR92, SAND94] rapidly emerged and became 
a proven technology for managing and enforcing security in large-scale enterprise-wide systems.  
The RBAC model was formally introduced by Sandhu et al. [SAND96] in 1996.  A major 
purpose of RBAC is to provide more efficient and effective security administration [NYAN95].   
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) uses three basic entities: users (U), roles (R), and 
permissions (P) (as shown in Figure 2.4).     
 
Figure 2.4 Role-based Access Control Model  
A user can be a human or a computer process.  A role is a job function or job title within the 
organization, and is used for describing a collection of users with the same privileges.   A 
permission is an approval of a particular mode of access to one or more objects in the system, it is 
equivalent to the term: authorization, access right or privilege.  A role is used to associate users 
with permissions.  The fundamental relations in RBAC are user-role assignment and permission-
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role assignment, that is, assigning users and permissions to appropriate roles. The idea of role is 
closely related to the concept of user group in traditional AC models.  However, user group are 
usually defined as sets of users only; without associating them with permissions.  The NIST study 
[FERR93] also indicates that roles in an organization are more stable than user groups, the latter 
changing more frequently.   
In addition to the basic components of the model, RBAC also provides role hierarchies and 
constraints [SAND96].  Role hierarchies are established when roles can inherit permissions from 
other roles [BARK97].  Multiple inheritance of permissions is also possible, i.e. one role can 
inherit permissions from multiple roles.  Constraints are used to impose restrictions on acceptable 
configurations of the different components in RBAC [AHN00, JAEG99].  A common example is 
mutually disjoint roles, such as the purchasing manager role and the accounts payable manager 
role.  In RBAC, permissions are always positive, and denial of access is modelled as a constraint 
rather than a negative permission [COVI00].  Constraints can be applied to user-role assignment 
and permission-role assignment, to users and to roles for various sessions [BARK03].  In addition, 
constraints can also be applied to the role hierarchy itself.  Additional constraints can limit the 
number of senior (or junior) roles that a given role may have.  However, as a result of bringing 
together constraints and hierarchies, conflicting authorizations may appear.   Session is another 
important concept in RBAC.  Each session maps one user to possibly many roles and is only 
associated with a single user.  A user may have multiple sessions open at the same time, each in a 
different window on the workstation screen for instance.     
The RBAC model has many advantages over the traditional AC model [SAND96, COVI00, 
JOSH01].  It is policy neutral, thus is able to support both DAC and MAC.  The use of role 
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concept in security administration clearly defines the duties and rights for each position in 
distributed systems.  Furthermore, having roles in between users and permissions enables users to 
exercise much greater control over access configuration and review than by directly relating users 
to permissions [SAND96].  The establishment of role hierarchies naturally reflect the structure of 
an organization and the responsibility of individuals in the organization, such as a senior role 
inherits all permissions held by a junior role [ANDE04, BARK97].   All these advantages make 
the RBAC model suitable for enterprise security systems [BHAT04b, JOSH01, LIU04].  
However, in order to provide access control for distributed enterprise systems at the application 
level, RBAC needs to be extended and modified to be more flexible and to address specific 
requirements [ALKA02, BERT05, BHAT03, COVI00, YANG03].  For example, in the RBAC 
model, permission is an abstract concept specified by objects and access modes (operation-object), 
and specific meaning has to be attributed to it in different situations.  A simple and efficient 
expression of permission is required to suit application-level access control.   The meaning of 
user in the model should not be restricted to humans that are represented by their identities.  A 
user may be a process, an application or a service, and user credentials may be used instead of 
traditional user identities.  Also, user-role assignment may not be predefined by administrators, 
but rather it can be dynamic according to access control policies and environmental factors.   
2.3 Access Control Requirements for Enterprise Systems 
Modern enterprise systems are often distributed and take advantage of Internet technology, 
which allows information stored at different physical or logical locations to be shared across the 
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entire enterprise system [LOSA02, MCGO03, RICH04].  However, the heterogeneous and 
distributed nature of enterprise systems, especially Web-based enterprise systems, pose many 
security challenges.  To address these challenges, Coetzee and Eloff [COET03] provided a 
comprehensive summary of Access Control (AC) requirements for enterprise systems.   
1. Identity management -- integrate the existing multiple authentication mechanism to form a 
unified identity management mechanism.  
2. Policy management – access control policy needs to be properly managed by policy 
specification language and other mechanisms [BIDA98]. 
3. Trust influences access control enforcement – inter-domain/inter-application communication 
relies on the trust of the service provider towards the service requester [BLAZ00].  
4. Flexible access control decisions are required to support policy changes – access control 
decision making mechanisms should not be bound to the application [BEZN98].    
5. Standards-based implementation – security standards aiming at broad frameworks ought to be 
independent of technologies and configuration models.  The adoption of standards such as 
Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML), XML Access Control Language (XACML) 
[ANDE04] and WS-security [WSPO] allow interoperation between different domains in 
enterprise systems. 
6. Independent security domains should be maintained – each domain or application in an 
enterprise system has its own access control mechanism that is governed by a variety of 
access control policies. The ability of a domain or application to make authorization decisions 
is called authorization autonomy [VIME96].   
7. Separation of policy from mechanisms – access control policies need to be decoupled from 
the decision-making mechanisms [BEZN98]. 
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8. Integration of existing access control policies – independent access control policies from 
component applications need to be integrated into the access control policies of the enterprise 
system [HALE99, IDRS94].  
9. The order of events must be controlled – enterprise users may invoke multiple Web services 
to communicate with different parties.  The result produced by one Web service can influence 
other Web services [BPEL03].  
10. Access control policy composition – The global policy of an enterprise system is composed 
of independent local access control policies [VIME96].  This process should be performed 
dynamically according to the changing environments. 
The above requirements outlined some of the essential issues in enterprise access control.  In 
this thesis, we will only address the first five topics in the list.    The rest of the topics are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
2.4 Summary  
In this chapter, we introduced security concepts and terminologies that would be frequently 
used in the later chapters.  A variety of security policies and security mechanisms were analysed.  
A classical access control mechanism/model, Access Control Matrix (ACM) and its extensions 
were presented.  ACM is the most precise model for describing authorization states.  In addition, 
many later models were developed on top of ACM.  As a popular access control model, the Role-
based Access Control (RBAC) model was the main focus of this review.  It was governed by two 
basic relations: user-role assignment and permission-role assignment.  The use of role has 
significantly reduced security administration and made access co
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RBAC also includes two other features: role hierarchy and constraints.  Role hierarchy can reduce 
the number of authorizations stored in memory, whereas constraints can be used to support 
complex access control policies.  At the end of the chapter, we provided a summary of access 
control requirements for enterprise systems, and identified issues that would be addressed in this 
thesis.      
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Chapter 3  
Authorization-function-based RBAC 
3.1 Introduction 
Supported by improved communication technologies, an enterprise system can now integrate 
many heterogeneous and autonomous components, such as numerous database systems, 
file/document systems or resource management systems, in order to provide unified functionality 
[PAYT00, PERK03].  However, it also brings together a large numbers of users and a variety of 
resources.  This has caused serious problems with regard to access control and security 
management [ALKA02, BHAT04b].  In the past, a number of important security models have 
been proposed for a variety of systems.  Earlier models, such as the access matrix model (ACM), 
[HARR76] are mostly designed for operating systems and database systems.  Several influential 
models, such as Bertino’s model [BERT99] for relational databases and Rabitti’s model [RABI91] 
for Object-Oriented databases, have addressed database access control extensively.   The 
development of Web technology has led to recent models that address XML document 
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security [BERT01a] [BERT01b] [BHAT04a].  These models were all developed in the 
framework of subject-operation-object, a framework initially introduced by the ACM.  There are 
a number of other access control approaches, including Task-based Access Control (TBAC) 
[THOM93], Partition-rule based Access Control (PRAC) [ACEV97], and per-method access 
control [EVER00, EVER02].  These approaches, however, were designed for particular types of 
systems or to solve particular types of problems, and are not generally applicable.  The above-
mentioned models are inadequate to address security issues in the new enterprise environment.  A 
generic application-level model is required for enterprise systems. 
3.1.1 Problem Statement 
In enterprise systems, a pressing issue is the lack of an efficient, generic application-level 
model that supports unified access control frameworks for user-to-system interactions.  
Traditional security models are not capable of addressing some of the new challenges posed by 
modern enterprise systems [ACEV97].  One of the problems is that most of the existing security 
models are influenced by the subject-operation-object paradigm. A typical feature of the 
paradigm is that privileges or permissions are represented as approvals of access to an object in 
specified access modes (operation-object).  This type of permission representation has 
complicated the security management of large enterprise systems due to the heterogeneity of 
resources involved in authorizations.  Hence, they are not suitable for supporting a unified access 
control framework that involves different types of resources from multiple domains.  
An essential goal of this chapter is to provide an efficient and generic description of 
authorization. In a distributed application, user heterogeneity has been resolved by assigning 
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users to roles, however, the problem of resource heterogeneity in security management has not 
been properly addressed as mentioned above.  This is especially so when the execution of a user 
request involves a series of actions that access different types of resources in multiple domains, 
and security management becomes extremely difficult.  For example, a user request to “View 
Customer Record” may ultimately access customer personal details from a company’s database 
system, a customer portrait from an image base, customer contract agreements reached on the 
phone from an audio repository, and XML-based Customer Orders from the sales department.  At 
the application level, the only concerning issue is whether or not “View Customer Record” can be 
accessed, not how it is conducted at a lower level.  It would be unnecessary to specify and 
evaluate accesses to individual data items when performing application-level access control 
An authorization representation also needs to be expressive enough to describe access control 
policies for a variety of resources. This requirement is essential to a unified access control 
framework.  Due to the heterogeneity of distributed systems, a unique set of access modes is 
established for every type of resource.  For example, in a database system, access modes may be 
defined as “read”, “write”, “update”, whereas in a file management system, access modes can be 
“view”, “modify”, “create”, “destroy”.  Authorizations specified by heterogeneous resources and 
a diversity of access modes can be complex.  The situation becomes worse if object hierarchy and 
access modes hierarchy are introduced.  Although the hierarchical structures may simplify the 
authorization specification to some extent, it can introduce many conflicts to the authorization.  
Consequently, a set of conflict resolutions must be developed.  This will not only introduce more 
complexity to a security system, but also cause possible service repudiation due to authorization 
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inconsistency.  Furthermore, these access types are bound to specific resources or systems, hence 
they cannot provide support for a unified framework.   
Another important aspect of an access control model is the ability to support a wide range of 
security policies.  In a distributed system, a variety of security policies are specified to ensure 
data confidentiality and integrity, and to convey business rules, some of them must be specified in 
a fine-grained manner [ACEV97].  For example, if a user requests access to some service, but 
only part of the service is available to this user, simply permitting or forbidding the user request 
would be inappropriate.  In a similar case, a service can only be accessed within a certain time 
frame.  A security system is required to provide more precise authorization services to satisfy 
both business requirements and security requirements of the enterprise.  However, current 
business applications/systems do not have a systematic way of defining access control to such 
fine granularity.  The existing RBAC models and their extensions are unable to provide fine-
grained access control for enterprise systems, such as controlling the content of user input and 
system output.   
3.1.2 Outline of the Proposed Solution 
Having identified the problems in the area, this chapter presents an enhanced version of 
RBAC – Authorization-function-based RBAC (FB-RBAC) model.  The proposed model aims to 
provide an efficient and unified access control framework for enterprise-wide systems.  It is 
designed for application-level access control that resides on top of all the existing lower level 
(back-end) security systems, such as database security systems and secure file systems. In this 
model, authorization-function (hereafter, A-function) is used as the basic unit of access control.  
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A-functions represent business functionalities exposed by the enterprise application interface and 
are proxies to access various back-end resources.  
 
Figure 3.1 The Application of Authorization-functions in Enterprise Systems 
Accordingly, an authorization is specified as an approval of access to an A-function. This has 
significantly simplified security specification and administration.  A-function is a system and 
platform independent notion, hence it can support unified access control for an integrated system.  
However, A-function alone cannot describe a variety of security policies.  In this thesis, the 
concept of constraint defined in RBAC is used to specify complex security policies.  When 
constraints are imposed on the input and output parameters of an A-function, the system will be 
able to control not only what A-function is accessed, but also the content of the input to the 
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system and the result of execution.  Furthermore, a simple and self-explanatory policy algebra is 
provided to express authorizations and various constraint-based security policies.     
3.1.3 Summary of Contributions  
The main contribution of this chapter is that it provides an enhanced RBAC – authorization-
function-based RBAC (FB-RBAC) for unified application-level access control in enterprise 
systems. A new concept of permission – Authorization-function (A-function) is introduced for 
authorization specification.  A-function is a simpler expression compared to the traditional 
operation-object paradigm.  Hence, the introduction of A-function in authorization specification 
can significantly simplify security management in enterprise-wide security systems.  The FB-
RBAC model is not restricted to enterprise applications and platforms, since the A-function can 
be used to describe any type of resources and access types.  The efficiency and generality of the 
model also provide support for a unified access control framework, and bring together existing 
lower level security components within a multi-application/multi-domain enterprise system.  
Additionally, this model also supports a wide range of possibly fine-grained access control 
policies using the concept of constraints.  It is envisaged that the proposed model can be applied 
to a variety of enterprise applications such as the emerging Web service applications perhaps with 
some modification.   
3.1.4 Structure of the Chapter 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 sets the scene by reviewing 
relevant literature. It discusses and compares the security management in various security models, 
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especially the RBAC model and its extensions, which are analyzed in detail. It argues that the 
existing security models are unable to address some of the challenges posed by modern enterprise 
systems. Section 3.3 will address the problem mentioned in section 3.1 and section 3.2.  It 
presents the A-function-based RBAC model extending the existing RBAC model.  A detailed 
discussion will be provided on how the A-function can be used to support efficient security 
management. In addition, constraints are used extensively to describe various security policies, 
and a simple policy algebra is used to describe authorizations and security policies. The 
contributions of the proposed solution and its advantages over the existing solutions are discussed 
in section 3.4.  Finally, the major arguments and findings of this chapter are summarized in 
section 3.5. 
3.2 Background 
An enterprise system needs to provide various users with controlled access to heterogenous 
resources. Traditional access control models designed for operating systems [HARR76] or 
database systems [BERT99, RABI91] are constrained by the framework of subject, object and 
access modes (or operation, access rights, access type). This subject-operation-object paradigm 
has several drawbacks (as mentioned in section 3.1.1).  One of them is that this paradigm cannot 
efficiently describe authorizations and security policies; moreover, this paradigm is tightly 
coupled with specific applications/systems, hence it cannot support a unified access control 
framework. This section provides a review of the existing security models with regard to 
enterprise access control.  In particular, RBAC and its various extensions will be discussed in 
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detail, since they have been the main focus of the recent research in security models, and are 
widely adopted in many enterprise systems.    
3.2.1 Access Control Requirements for Enterprise-wide Systems 
A fundamental difference between enterprise systems and traditional centralised systems is 
that the former is extremely diversified and distributed in nature.  This feature poses great 
challenges (as mentioned in section 3.1.1) to access control and security management of 
enterprise-wide systems. According to relevant studies [ACEV97, CHAN03], an effective 
enterprise access control framework needs to: 
● support efficient access control and security management for enterprise systems, 
● provide a generic access control mechanism that is capable of describing heterogeneous 
resources hosted by various applications, 
● specify a variety of security policies and model different access control scenarios in 
enterprise systems, and 
● include a wide range of authorization conditions/constraints in access control decision 
making.  
In this section, models and the aspects of the models in relation to the above-mentioned 
access control requirements for enterprise security systems are discussed.  Their relative merits 
and drawbacks will be analysed in the following section.  
CHAPTER 3. AUTHORIZATION-FUNCTION-BASED RBAC 32 
3.2.2 Access Control Models for Enterprise Systems 
One of the alternative approaches to traditional subject-operation-object paradigm is task-
based access control (TBAC) proposed by Thomas and Sandhu [THOM93]. TBAC views access 
control and authorization not in terms of individual subject and objects, but in terms of long-lived 
tasks that need to be authorized and managed in information systems. This approach has some 
advantages over the subject-operation-object approach, because the term “task” is more generic 
than the combination of operation and object. The TBAC model can very well model task-
oriented security policies like Separation of Duty (SoD) and the Chinese Wall, as well as carry 
out work flow control effectively.  However, this model is specifically designed to protect 
business activities and transactions in a distributed environment.  It does not provide generic 
access control mechanisms for handling a variety of situations in enterprise-wide systems.     
With the popularity of the Object-Oriented (OO) paradigm, an Object-Oriented access control 
model was proposed for general OO-based systems [EVER00, EVER02]. This model uses per-
method access control based on the interface methods of an object. At the same time, constraints 
can be imposed on user-to-system interactions, based on the parameters of the methods.  This 
allows the per-method access control to provide fine-grained semantic protection that the 
traditional per-attribute (data item) access control models are unable to achieve.  In the security 
specification, the concept of method can describe user-to-system interaction more efficiently than 
the traditional per-attribute access control.  However, per-method access control is only 
applicable to Object-Oriented database systems.  Yet an enterprise access control system should 
be generic regardless of the underlying system architecture.  
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Although both models have improved object heterogeneity by using “task” or “method” as 
the basic access control unit, they are still unable to manage large numbers of users in enterprise 
systems.  Both models fall short of generality as each of them targets at a specific problem or a 
specific system in the area.  Hence, they cannot be used to support a unified access control 
framework that involves heterogeneous users and resources.   
3.2.3 Role-based Access Control 
The background chapter introduced the main components and contributions of Role-based 
Access Control (RBAC) [SAND96]. Among all existing models, RBAC is considered to be the 
most suitable for enterprise systems, due to its generality and expressiveness [AHN00, CHAN03]. 
This section will focus on how authorization is represented in RBAC and the concept of 
constraints in RBAC. In RBAC96, a permission is described as an approval of a particular mode 
of access to one or more objects in the system [SAND96]. Permissions are assigned to roles rather 
than individual users, since the concept of role provides long-term identity for the system.  For 
instance, in a company, if a user is a system administrator and is assigned to the role “Sys 
Admin”, then this user is more likely to hold this role as long as they work as a system 
administrator in the company. Hence, the notion of role has modelled the position and privileges 
of a user in an organisation concisely.  Therefore, permissions assigned to each role are changed 
less frequently than permissions assigned to individual users. Compared with the huge number of 
users in a distributed system, the number of roles is much smaller and thus becomes more 
manageable.  This has significantly reduced the size of the authorization base and the level of 
administration complexity.  The RBAC model also allows inheritance so that role hierarchies may 
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be established. In a role hierarchy, senior roles inherit all privileges from their junior roles. By 
using role inheritance, only permissions that are specific to the role are defined; permissions that 
are common to both senior roles and junior roles are specified for the junior roles only. This 
structure avoids repetition of permission specifications and can further reduce the number of 
authorizations stored in the authorization base.  
 
Figure 3.2 RBAC model (modified from Figure 1 in [SAND96]) 
However, in RBAC96 [SAND96], a permission is still represented in the form of operation-
object which describes the traditional database access paradigm.  In enterprise systems, there are 
a large number and types of resources, such as database items, files, and heterogeneous hardware. 
When authorizations are specified by operation-object paradigm, an enterprise system needs to 
define a set of access modes for each type of resource, such as read, write, update for databases, 
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view element, view schema, destroy and create for documents – which is inefficient.  With the 
use of access rights hierarchy and object hierarchy, this paradigm becomes even more 
complicated, hence is no longer suitable for describing heterogenous resources in distributed 
systems.  
RBAC96 uses the concept of constraint to specify conditions that must be satisfied in 
authorizations.  Constraints (as indicated by the Figure 3.2) can be applied virtually to any of the 
concepts specified in the RBAC model. Yet when the concept of constraint is used in a user/role 
assignment in an active session directly, it will affect authorization decisions. By using 
constraints, the authors demonstrated that RBAC is capable of supporting some well-known 
security policies such as Separation of Duty (SoD) and prerequisite role.  However, constraints in 
the context of RBAC did not receive enough attention in RBAC96, although they carry great 
importance as they can be used in various situations to specify a wide range of security policies. 
3.2.4 Extensions of the RBAC model 
Since it was first proposed, various extensions have been made to RBAC, aiming to improve 
one or more aspects of the model. For instance, Covington and Moyer proposed an extension to 
RBAC -- generalized RBAC [COVI00] that includes not only subject role, but also object role 
and environmental role. Here an object is classified into a relevant object role according to the 
properties of this object. Therefore, policy specifications are not based on individual subjects and 
objects, but on subject roles and object roles. The GRBAC model also allows policy designers to 
specify system state through environment roles. An environment role can be based on any system 
state that the system can accurately collect. This role allows various constraints to be specified as 
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authorizations. Hence the model is able to describe a variety of security policies based on 
environmental roles. The use of object role has improved object heterogeneity, hence further 
simplifying the authorization specification. However, the side effect is that it also increased the 
complexity of policy administration and evaluation, since all system objects need to be classified 
into object roles for the model to work.  Such a classification is not an easy task, because some 
objects in the system may not have any classifiable property, while others have multiple 
properties that can be assigned to a number of object roles.  In fact, GRBAC’s generality makes it 
even more susceptible to various types of policy conflicts and ambiguities. 
The ORBAC model [YANG03] proposed a new role concept -- task role in addition to the 
traditional role concept (which is named position role instead).  Each position role contains 
several task roles, and task roles are given privileges to perform specific tasks. It is suggested that 
the specification of security policies like SoD can be better described using task roles instead of 
the traditional position role.   
RBAC has also been used for Web Services in Business Process (WS-RBAC4BP) [LIU04].  
WS-RBAC4BP differs from traditional RBAC in that it takes company as the subject and Web 
services as the protected object.  The authors argue that the identities of individual users are not 
important in business processes, therefore, in WS-RBAC4BP, security constraints are defined in 
terms of company.  However, both frameworks are designed to resolve specific problems in the 
area, and do not possess a generic access control framework.   
Wang and Li [WANG04] proposed an extensive role-based access control (ERBAC) model.  
This model substitutes the abstract notion of permission with a set of “tasks” based on 
organizational task decomposition.  This approach has in fact combined the advantages of RBAC 
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and TBAC [THOM93].  Hence, it can significantly simplify the specification and administration 
of authorizations and security policies. However, this paper has only discussed the use of business 
tasks in implementing business oriented separation of duty (SoD) policy.  It did not provide a 
comprehensive analysis on how business tasks can be used to enforce access control in different 
situations, and to support a variety of security policies besides SoD.   
3.2.5 Summary of Existing Work 
Among the existing security models, task-based access control and per-method access control 
are two unique approaches that have addressed the problems of object heterogeneity in enterprise 
systems. However, both approaches focus on specific types of problems without providing a 
generic framework for various enterprise systems.  RBAC has been widely recognized as a 
promising technology for enterprise-wide systems. Compared with traditional security models, 
RBAC has effectively reduced the number of subjects as well as the complexity of permission 
management due to the flexibility with which roles may be configured and reconfigured. Since 
RBAC is a policy neutral model, it is also able to support a wide range of security policies.  
A great deal of effort has been devoted to extending RBAC and improving RBAC in various 
aspects. Some extended the role concept to include subject role, object role and environmental 
role [COVI00], others defined task role and position role to facilitate more specific and fine-
grained permission assignment [YANG03].  In all the above-mentioned models, permissions are 
represented in a variety of forms ranging from the traditional operation-object form [SAND96] to 
various new forms like task [WANG04], method [EVER00], company [LIU04] and object role 
[COVI00].  However, these representations are inadequate for describing a large number and 
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types of resources.  Some of them target at specific problems or systems, but fall short of 
supporting a wider range of security policies and/or resources.  So far there are no application-
level models that can provide efficient security management, and support a unified access control 
framework and a wide range of security policies in enterprise systems.   
3.3 The Authorization-function-based RBAC Model 
As discussed in section 3.1.1 and 3.2, the existing access control models are limited in their 
generality as they are purpose specific.  In addition, they also fall short in several aspects such as 
authorization representations and the ability to support a variety of security policies.  In this 
chapter, an authorization-function-based RBAC (FB-RBAC) model that addresses the problems 
specified in section 3.1.1 is proposed.   
3.3.1 Motivation 
One of the important problems in the existing models is that their permission representations 
are not suitable for describing application-level authorizations.  In this chapter, a new form of 
permission – Authorization-function (A-function) to express and manage authorizations for 
enterprise functionality is proposed.  The motivation for using the A-function and developing an 
A-function-based access control model arises from the fact that in an enterprise system, users 
interact with enterprise applications by executing a prescribed set of functions that control access 
to the back-end resources. These business functions may contain complex business logic, and are 
implemented by several simpler functions to carry out specific activities.  At the end of function-
call chains, resource-accessing functions are called to invoke various operations on resources.  
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For example, if an enterprise system needs to provide controlled access to a back-end database, 
then although ultimately users access the data repository at the back-end, they never do so 
directly, as this would imperil the consistency and integrity of the data.  Thus, even though much 
of the research in database access control has focused on individual database objects in enterprise 
systems (e.g., attributes, tuples, and tables), users are never allowed to directly access a back-end 
data repository because of the risks to data integrity.  In all cases, a set of A-functions is provided 
by the application to manage data access.  This is also true for all other resource accesses that are 
conducted in the same manner, that is, through the use of functions.  Hence, the problem of 
enabling different users to access and manipulate a variety of resources can be best described by 
whether users are allowed to execute functions of enterprise applications in a safe and controlled 
manner.   
3.3.2 Authorization-function-based Access Control  
3.3.2.1 Formal Definition of Authorization-function 
In order to clearly describe authorization-function-based access control, it is necessary to 
provide a formal definition for the concept of Authorization-function. An Authorization-function 
(shown in Figure 3.3) is a function exposed by an application interface to the outside world for 
the purpose of executing a certain user request.  It is the only channel through which an enterprise 
application/system interacts with users or other applications/systems.   
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Figure 3.3 A-function as the Sole Channel for User-to-System Interaction 
In our model, A-function is used as the basic access control unit and a permission 
representation.  An A-function consists of two parts: an interface and an implementation.  Its 
interface exposes functions to the outside world and the potential users, suggesting its 
functionality, availability and possibly access requirements. The implementation of A-function 
contains executions of user requests based on pre-defined business logic.   The A-function can 
also be seen as the proxy to access all enterprise resources. 
The authorization-function-based access control model maintains the role-permission 
paradigm from RBAC, but provides more expressive notations for permission instead of the 
operation-object pair.  In the A-function-based approach, the abstract concept of permission is 
expressed as an approval of access to a particular A-function as shown in Figure 3.4.  
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Figure 3.4 Authorization-Function-Based Role-Based Access Control (FB-RBAC)  
This change of permission representation from operation-object to A-function has made 
RBAC more suitable for application-level access control, since authorization specifications can 
be simplified from subject-operation-object to role-A-function.   
3.3.2.2 An Example of Authorization-function-based Application 
To better illustrate the concept of an A-function, an example is provided in Figure 3.5.   In a 
typical enterprise application, a form delivered by a graphic user interface (GUI) provides users 
with a list of functions such as searching for customer details and placing an order.  They are 
described by a set of interface objects like text field, buttons or menu items. Each of these 
functions can be represented by an A-function.   By clicking a button or selecting a menu item, a 
corresponding A-function will be activated. 
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Figure 3.5 An Example of an Application Interface 
An extract from the list of A-functions corresponding to Figure 3.5 is given below. 
● Customer searchCustomerByID(int cust_id) {…..} 
● Customer[] searchCustomerByName(String cust_name) {…..}  
● int insertCustomer(Customer newCust) {….} 
● int updateCreditLimit(Customer cust, int newCreditLimit) {…..} 
● void updateCreditLimit(int customerID, int newCreditLimit) {…..} 
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For example, clicking the “Search by ID” button will activate the searchCustomerByID() 
function. There is a one-to-one relationship between A-function interface and A-function 
implementation (Figure 3.6). 
 
Figure 3.6 Relationship between Interface and Implementation of an A-function. 
An application interface does not need to be graphical.  In some Business-to-Business (B2B) 
interactions no human user is involved in the transaction as all processes are automated.     
3.3.2.3 Application of the Authorization-function-based Access Control Model 
The proposed model aims to provide a unified access control framework that can be applied 
on top of low level access control systems.  Figure 3.7 illustrates low-level (conventional) access 
control and application-level FB-RBAC in an enterprise system. 
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Figure 3.7 Access Control at Different Levels of a Distributed Enterprise System. 
The proposed model is designed to provide top-level access control for enterprise systems.  
Underneath, individual security systems are used to protect one or more types of resources.  
These security systems make authorization decisions based on whether or not a subject can access 
a particular file or resource in a particular access mode.  Hence, authorization decisions are made 
when systems are accessing specific objects like database items.  Traditional access control 
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models designed for database and operating systems are suitable for these types of security 
systems, but they cannot provide support for application-level access control due to the reasons 
mentioned in section 3.3.1.   
The real problem, however, for application-level access control is to control the execution of 
the functions.  For example, an enterprise application provides users a function called “View 
Customer Record”, then access control should be conducted to determine whether or not “View 
Customer Record” can be accessed.  It does not need to verify each access to different back-end 
resources initiated by the “View Customer Record” function.  This will be controlled by lower 
level access control systems such as the database security system or the file management system.  
Here, an access control decision is made when the user is accessing the interface A-function 
regardless of what resources are accessed by the A-function.  
3.3.3 Constraint-based Access Control  
One of the important requirements for enterprise access control is to support a wide range of 
security policies.  In this section, we will demonstrate how various security policies can be 
described by constraint as introduced in RBAC96 [SAND96].       
3.3.3.1 Using Constraints to Specify Security Policies 
In a dynamic and distributed environment, access control decisions may be affected by a 
variety of conditions, such as the input and output of an A-function, time and location as well as 
history access record.    Security policies may be described as constraints imposed on the above-
mentioned conditions.  Constraints can be used for laying out higher-level organizational policy 
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[SAND96].  However, it has not been fully utilized in the RBAC96 model (Figure 3.2).  In reality, 
constraints can be imposed virtually on any concepts of RBAC, such as user/role assignment, 
permission/role assignment, user, role and session.  In this section, we will investigate the 
applications of constraints in a variety of access control scenarios. 
As discussed in section 2.2.1, access control conditions (are defined as constraints imposed 
on various objects) in database systems can be classified into four different types: data-dependent 
conditions, time-dependent conditions, context-dependent conditions, and History-dependent 
conditions. However, this classification is specifically designed for database security. Yet it is 
insufficient to describe the circumstances of contemporary enterprise systems.  In order to 
provide finer-grained access control for user-to-system interactions, three important factors need 
to be considered: whether the input to the system is a valid input, whether the output returned by 
the system is verified, and whether the user has the permission to use the functionality provided 
by the system.  In FB-RBAC, access control conditions are classified into three categories. 
● A-function attribute conditions impose constraints on attributes of the A-function.  For 
example, the input and output of the A-function can play important roles in user-to-system 
interaction.  The input condition imposes constraints on the data fed into the A-function. The 
output condition imposes constraints on the information returned by the A-function. The 
input conditions and output conditions impose restrictions on the content of the input 
parameters and output parameters.  This type of access control is also called content-based 
access control.   
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● Environmental conditions specify a variety of constraints related to the operating 
environment, such as time, location, and system usage. This category of constraints subsumes 
the third condition specified by [CAST94] (refer to section 2.2.1). 
● History-dependent Conditions specify constraints dependent on previously performed access. 
These constraints remain unchanged from the fourth condition specified by Castano 
[CAST94] (refer to section 2.2.1).    
A complete FB-RBAC is depicted in Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8 A Complete FB-RBAC Model 
In authorization-based access control, input parameters and output parameters will be 
evaluated against predefined security policies.  By imposing constraints on the input and output 
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parameters of an A-function, user-to-system interaction in enterprise systems can be controlled in 
a fine-grained manner.  Together with environmental conditions and history-dependent conditions, 
the proposed model allows a variety of security policies to be specified for various access control 
scenarios.    
3.3.3.2 Policy Algebra for Constraint Specification in FB-RBAC 
This section proposes a context-free policy algebra to express constraints and security 
policies.  This policy algebra is largely self-explanatory.   
● Operator set: {AND, OR}, operators are used to join multiple conditions. 
● AND: both conditions need to be satisfied 
● OR: one of the conditions need to be satisfied 
● Predicates Set: {>, <, ≤, ≥, ≠, ∉∈⊂⊄ ,,, }, predicates are used to evaluate a particular 
condition 
● =: equal to 
● ≠: not equal to 
● > greater than 
● < less than 
● ≤ less than or equal to 
● ≥ greater that or equal to 
● ∈ : an element of 
● ∉ : not an element of.   
● ⊂ : a subset of  
● :⊄  not a subset of 
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This policy algebra can be easily extended by adding new operators and predicates. In the 
next section, several examples are used to illustrate different types of constraints and how they 
can be expressed using the policy algebra.   
Example 1: Input Conditions 
Sometimes business rules will specify conditions in which input data can be accepted by an 
A-function. The evaluation of these rules depends on the value of the input data.  The policy 
algebra can be used to specify and control the value of the data being passed to the A-function.  
For example, an A-function InsertCustomer() takes a list of user attributes as input and writes 
them to the database (Table 1).  A customer role is allowed to access this function with some 
limitations.  The inputs to the A-function can be limited to a certain value, such as user name, or a 
list of values, such as a group of user names. Input can be constrained, such as requiring Age < 25.     
Input 
attributes 
Customer-
ID 
Customer-
Name 
Age Address Telephone 
constraints  = “Wei Shi” >25 Victoria  
Table 3.1 Input Constraints 
Constraint on authorization (Customer, InsertCustomer) is expressed as: 
(CustomerName = “Wei Shi” 
AND Age > 25 
AND Address belongs to Victoria)  
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The above table indicates the constraint specified on input parameters.  If any input value 
does not satisfy the given rule, then the A-function will not be executed.   
Example 2: Output conditions 
Constraints can also be imposed on output parameters of the A-function. This may affect the 
outcome of the A-function execution. The system can choose to block some or all the results 
produced by the A-function. The following table (Table 2) specifies the conditions that must be 
satisfied by the output parameter of the A-function searchOrderByID(). 
Output 
Parameters 
Customer-
ID 
Customer-
Name 
Date Credit_limit Purchase 
Amount 
constraints  ∉VIP 
Customers 
1st Jan, 
2003 
-30th June, 
2003 
< 10000 < 10000 
Table 3.2 Output Constraints 
Constraint on authorization (Employee, searchOrderByID) is expressed as: 
(CustomerName ∉ VIP Customers 
AND 1st Jan, 2003 < Date < 30th June, 2003 
AND CreditLimit < 10000 
AND PurchaseAmount < 10000) 
If any of the output values does not satisfy the given rule, an administrator will have two 
options: strict compliance or selective compliance. Strict compliance means no result will be 
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returned to the user, whereas selective compliance only hides the constrained parameters and 
users are still able to see the rest of the results.  
Example 3: Environmental conditions 
Environmental conditions are based on the surrounding environment, such as time, location 
or system load.  For example, the access time has to be within a certain time frame, eg. 9am-5pm. 
The terminal is located in RMIT, or the number of the current users is less than 1000.   These 
conditions can be expressed as following: 
Time ⊂ {>9am AND < 5pm} 
Terminal Location = “RMIT” 
Login users < 1000  
Example 4: History-dependent Conditions 
In order to realize history-dependent access control, it is necessary to maintain access records 
to keep track of activities carried out by users and of the time of invocation. Every time user 
invokes an A-function, an audit trail creates a tuple that records user name, role assigned, A-
function performed, time of access, and possibly a Session ID as well. History-dependent access 
control can be used to implement well-known security policies like “separation of duty” and 
“Chinese Wall” [BREW89].  To implement a Chinese Wall policy, it is necessary to keep a 
record of user history actions.  For example, if a group of companies are defined as having a 
Conflict Of Interest (COI), then a consultant is not allowed to read information from more than 
one company in any given COI group.  The “Chinese Wall” policy in this case relies on the 
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history of the consultant to decide whether this consultant has already accessed information from 
companies in the same COI group.      
3.3.4 Comparison with Existing Access Control models 
 Among existing models, a variety of expressions are used to represent permissions, such as 
operation-object [HARR76, BERT99, RABI91], task [THOM93, WANG04], action [WANG04], 
method [EVER00, EVER02] and service [BHAT04c]. But authorization-function is more suitable 
for application-level access control than any of these for the following reasons.  Authorization-
function is a simpler notion than operation-object used in many security models; easier to 
administer than object role; more meaningful than terms like task and action when describing 
access control and security policies in enterprise systems; and it also has the generality that 
method and service do not have.   
Below a simple example is used to illustrate why the A-function-based approach is better 
than the traditional operation-object approach. For example, an A-function called 
searchCustomerByID() takes Customer ID as the input, and returns a list of customer information. 
Suppose customer information is stored in several data repositories, for example the customer 
residential address is stored in the Address database, Customer Credit information is stored in the 
Credit Detail database, and the Update Credit Policy in the Policy.txt file.  Table 3 compares the 
authorization specifications of three different models for the scenario. The following assumptions 
are made for user/role assignment in RBAC and FB-RBAC. There are multiple users in the 
system, and some of them (Mary, John, … )  can be assigned to the role ‘employee’. This role has 
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permission to access the A-function searchCustomerByID().  A closed world policy is assumed in 
all three models, which forbids everything that is not explicitly allowed [ESSM99].  
Access Control Matrix 
(ACM) (S, A, O) 
Role-based Access Control 
(RBAC) (R, A, O) 
Authorization-function-
based RBAC (FB-RBAC) 
(R, F) 
(Mary, R, CustomerAddress) (Employee, R, 
CustomerAddress) 
(employee, 
searchCustomerByID) 
(Mary, R, CreditDetail) (Employee, R, CreditDetail)  
(Mary, R, 
UpdateCreditPolicy) 
(Employee, R, 
UpdateCreditPolicy) 
 
(John, R, CustomerAddress)    
(John, R, CreditDetail)   
(John, R, 
UpdateCreditPolicy) 
  
Authorization for more users   
Table 3.3 Authorization Specification in Access Control Matrix in Role-Based Access Control 
and in Authorization-Function-Based RBAC Model 
As shown in Table 3.3, the traditional ACM specifies authorization as a tuple of three (S, A, 
O). It is required to define authorizations for each data manipulation. Therefore, authorization 
evaluation is also carried out three times during invocation of the A-function 
searchCustomerByID() for each user request. The authorization specification for RBAC is much 
simpler, it assigns users to roles, hence reducing the number of authorizations by N number of 
times where N is the number of users assigned to the role employee. With the new A-function-
based RBAC model, all three data accesses used for the same task are grouped in the A-function 
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searchCustomerByID() at the time when user/role assignment is in place. Correspondingly, 
authorization specification in the new model is reduced to a single tuple (Employee, 
searchCustomerByID).  The comparison clearly indicates that the FB-RBAC approach can 
greatly reduce the complexity of authorization specification and administration.  Authorization 
evaluation at the application-level will be performed only once, when users are making requests.  
Moreover, the FB-RBAC model considers a wide range of access control conditions that 
existing security models are unable to do. These constraints include those imposed on the result 
of executions and user requests. An A-function-based access policy suggests that the granularity 
of data access is at the level of the A-function, i.e. the user is either granted or denied authority to 
execute an A-function.  It is also capable of providing fine granularity access control by 
controlling the parameter list and the values returned by the A-functions that are executed. The 
model controls the parameter list and values returned by the A-functions to comply with roles’ 
access rights and the enterprise’s business rules.  
3.4 Discussion and Future Work 
In section 3.1.1, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, we showed that the existing models are not suitable for 
application-level access control due to the way permissions are represented in authorization 
specifications.  These representations may be inefficient, or are designed for specific problems or 
systems.  The proposed FB-RBAC provides application-level access control that complements the 
existing lower level access control mechanisms such as a database security system, secure file 
system and resource management systems.  A new form of permission, authorization-function (A-
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function), was used in conjunction with the notion of role for authorization specifications.  The 
combination of role and A-function has effectively addressed subject heterogeneity and object 
heterogeneity in enterprise systems and provided an efficient way of specifying and administering 
authorizations.  The concept of constraints in RBAC96 is used to support a variety of security 
policies.  When constraints are imposed on the input and output parameters of an A-function, it 
will be able to carry out fine-grained access control based on the contents of input and output.  
The advantages of FB-RBAC can be summarized as below: 
● The proposed model is independent of the types of systems and resources involved, hence it 
can be used to support a unified access control framework in distributed enterprise systems. 
● The A-function is also the sole channel for accessing back-end resources, thus making it a 
suitable expression for describing permissions.  
● The combination of role and A-function-based approaches can efficiently describe enterprise-
level authorization and avoid the complications raised by heterogeneous access modes 
associated with different resources.  Hence, the proposed application-level model is able to 
simplify the security specification, administration and evaluation.  
● The basic elements of FB-RBAC model – the Authorization-functions are extracted directly 
from enterprise applications. They conform to various enterprise applications, so the model 
can be easily adapted to distributed enterprise applications/systems.   
● FB-RBAC is a policy neutral model, so it is not restrained by a particular type of policy, such 
as both MAC and DAC. 
● The model supports a wide range of security policies including fine-grained access control 
policies 
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● The implementation of an authorization-function may be modified from time to time as 
required by database updates, changes in enterprise business policy or the sources of the data, 
but authorization policy specified in the form of role-A-function will remain unchanged.   
When the proposed model is implemented in an enterprise system, there may be some 
inconsistency between the authorization of the application-level system and the authorization of 
the low-level system of individual components.  To resolve such conflicts, a top-down approach 
may be used if it is a centralised system so that lower level authorizations can be derived from or 
made conform to high-level authorization. Bottom-up approaches can be used where low-level 
security systems are autonomous, so that any high-level authorizations involving resources 
protected by low-level security system are derived from low-level authorizations. It is also 
possible to have two separately specified authorization sets where one could override the decision 
of another. Furthermore, the proposed model is also facing a problem common to all security 
models.  That is to express authorization and security policies in an unambiguous form and for 
them to be able to be understood by various systems.  The policy algebra proposed (section 
3.3.3.2) provides limited syntax and semantic and is unable to provide uniform and unambiguous 
specifications for security policies.  Moreover, the proposed model has not discussed how role 
assignment is conducted in a dynamic and distributed environment.  Role assignment will be 
covered in chapter 4 in the context of Web service applications.  In chapter 5, an ontology-based 
approach for specifying security policies and role assignment will be presented. 
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3.5 Summary and Conclusion  
The large number and types of users and resources in an enterprise system pose several 
challenges to access control and security management. This chapter has reviewed some of the 
well-known security models with regard to authorization representations. It has found that the 
traditional access control models are not suitable for enterprise access control either because of 
administration complexity or lack of generality.  There is no high-level access control model that 
addresses the needs of open distributed enterprise systems.  
In this chapter, an application-level access control model -- FB-RBAC, was proposed for 
distributed enterprise systems. FB-RBAC was an extension of RBAC96 and it inherits all its 
advantages such as policy neutrality, and platform and programming language independence, so it 
can be implemented in a variety of distributed enterprise systems. Authorization-function is used 
as the basic unit of access control and to represent permission in authorization specifications.  
Authorizations are specified using roles and A-functions.  The combination of role and A-
function significantly reduces the complexity of security management, hence will increase access 
control efficiency.  This chapter also discussed the application of A-function using a real life 
example.  This example shows that A-functions are the only channels for users to access back-end 
resources, so they are most suitable for controlling user-to-system interactions.  The proposed 
model may be implemented in the middle-tier, hence complements the lower level protection 
mechanisms to provide complete security protections for enterprise systems.   Moreover, the FB-
RBAC also extends the concept of constraint to describe various access control conditions and 
support a wide range of security policies.  Constraints imposed on attributes of an A-function 
such as input and output provide finer-grained access control for enterprise systems.    The 
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proposed model also provides a simple policy algebra in which different types of security policies 
can be formally expressed.  At the end, a comparison between FB-RBAC and two well-known 
models (ACM and RBAC96) was provided.  This comparison shows that FB-RBAC is more 
efficient than some of the most influential models.  At the end the discussion section 
demonstrated that the generality and efficiency of the FB-RBAC makes it a promising access 
control model for enterprise-wide systems.   
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Chapter 4   
An Extended RBAC Model for Web 
Service Applications 
4.1 Introduction 
Internet and web related technologies have advanced at tremendous speed in recent years, 
providing powerful functions for business processes.  One group of the new services provided by 
the Internet and Web is Web services which are the programmatic interfaces used in application-
to-application communications [WSAC].  Web services are developed for business integration 
and process automation, and have become the most popular applications in Business-to-Business 
(B2B) transactions due to their world wide applicability and remote accessibility.  They use 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) standards and are supported by core XML technologies.  
The development of Web services has added new features and functionality to the traditional 
client/server architecture.     
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Web services operate in an open distributed, decentralized, dynamic and interoperable 
environment, and are designed to be highly autonomous and distributed in nature, therefore 
access control of Web service applications is a challenging issue.  A variety of solutions have 
been developed to address specific security problems, such as Security Assertions Markup 
Language (SAML), X.509 public key certificate and the security part of Web Service 
Specification (WS* -Specification).  SAML provides an XML framework for exchanging 
authentication and authorization information for securing Web services, and relies on third-party 
authorities for provision of “assertions”. SAML is mainly used for authentication. X.509 public 
key certificates are currently used to protect SOAP-based messaging.  For Web service 
applications, the security related part of WS*- specification, including WS-Security, WS-Trust, 
WS-SecureConversation, WS-SecurityPolicy, and WS-Federation, provides a range of security 
services such as message integrity, authentication and confidentiality, security token exchange, 
message session security, security policy expression, and security for a federation of services 
within a system.  However, the above-mentioned security services are mainly used to protect Web 
services at the communication level. There are few application-level access control models for 
Web services.   
4.1.1 Problem Statement 
Providing efficient and reliable access control for dynamic and anonymous users is an 
essential requirement in the Web service environment.  Users in the Web environment are highly 
dynamic as they enter and leave Web service applications continuously and their profiles change 
frequently over time.  Users can be anonymous due to privacy concerns as they do not wish to 
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disclose their identity to strangers.  As a result, the identities of many Web service users are 
unknown to the system at the time of the request.   However, traditional models are mainly 
authentication based and require proof of identity or registration for effective centralized control.  
Such access control paradigm has many limitations due to spontaneity and privacy concerns, 
hence are not suitable for Web service applications [AGAR04a, AGAR04b].  Therefore, it is 
necessary to develop none-identity-based access control models in order to overcome such 
problems. 
The second challenge of Web service access control comes from the heterogeneity of subjects 
and objects involved in security specification, administration and evaluation of a Web service 
application, as Web services interconnect numerous systems, applications, user groups and 
resources.  However, administration of authorizations and security related information is still 
performed manually in many traditional security systems.  Manual security management is not a 
feasible solution in Web service environments because of the large number of subjects and 
objects involved.  Access control should be performed according to a set of predefined rules, and 
carried out automatically for Web service applications.    
Providing support to a wide range of security policies is always important to a successful 
access control model.  Security policies can be dynamic in a Web service environment.  For 
example, security policies may refer to dynamic conditions such as user profiles, user attributes, 
environmental factors and various other conditions, and these security policies may be temporal 
and fine-grained in nature.  On the other hand, traditional security policies like separation of duty 
(SoD), Chinese Wall and least privilege principle can still play important roles in Web service 
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access control.   Hence, access control models designed for Web services must be able to describe 
a variety of security policies.  
4.1.2 Outline of the Proposed Solution 
In this chapter, we propose an Extended Role-Based Access Control (ERBAC) model to 
address the challenges presented by the Web environment (refer to 4.1.1).  ERBAC extends the 
FB-RBAC proposed in chapter 3 to provide application-level access control for Web services 
applications.  In the ERBAC model, access control is no longer dependent on user identities, but 
on provided user credentials and a variety of access control rules.  It is assumed that each user 
credential contains authorizations required for user requested access, and user credentials are 
verified by a trusted third party.  This credential-based paradigm provides a flexible and secure 
way of handling dynamic and anonymous users in the Web environment.     
ERBAC improves FB-RBAC by introducing dynamic role assignment for access control in a 
Web environment.  User credentials are assigned to roles automatically according to the user 
capability encapsulated in user credentials and a set of security policies.   FB-RBAC is capable of 
simplifying security management of an enterprise system.  As dynamic role assignment is 
integrated with FB-RBAC model, we can further reduce the complexity of heterogeneous subjects 
and objects involved in manual role assignment of the traditional RBAC models.  The new role 
assignment approach also captures the continuously changing user profiles and environmental 
conditions. Hence, the extended model is more adaptable to the dynamic Web environment.   
The ERBAC model provides support for a variety of security policies using constraint-based 
access control and content-based access control.  These aspects are inherited from the FB-RBAC 
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model. Constraints can very well describe classic security policies like SoD and least privileged 
principle as well as access control requirements in a Web environment.   
Furthermore, this chapter also provides formal specifications for each concept involved in the 
proposed model and relationships between concepts using a set of mathematical symbols and 
predicates.  This allows security policies to be expressed in formalized notations.    
4.1.3 Summary of Contributions 
The main contribution is that the ERBAC provides an application-level access control for 
Web services on top of the security infrastructure that was designed to solve specific security 
problems.  ERBAC complements the security services that are used for communication level 
access control, such as ensuring message confidentiality and authentication.  ERBAC provides 
credential-based access control that resolves the problem of user dynamism and anonymity that 
cannot be resolved in identity-based access control models.   The proposed model inherits all 
advantages of the FB-RBAC, thus it is capable of addressing intensified subject heterogeneity and 
object heterogeneity in Web environments.  Moreover, dynamic role assignment is enabled in the 
model, so it is more adaptable to the changing environment.  At the same time, a set of formal 
semantics provided in ERBAC can specify authorizations and security policies in a clear and 
unambiguous form. This formalism can be mapped to an XML-based specification language to 
provide interoperable security specification.  
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4.1.4 Structure of the Chapter 
In section 4.2, we will first identify the access control requirements of Web services as 
presented by other researchers.  Then, a variety of none-identity-based role assignments and role 
assignment rules are introduced and analysed.   Their advantages and disadvantages in Web 
service applications are presented.  Section 4.3 proposes an enhanced version of FB-RBAC -- 
ERBAC model.  This model provides dynamic role assignment for Web service applications, and 
it supports a variety of security policies.  In addition, formal specification is provided to represent 
concepts and relations used in the model.  Section 4.4 discusses the contributions of ERBAC 
model and possible drawbacks.  Section 4.5 provides a summary of the chapter and draws 
concluding remarks.      
4.2 Background 
Nowadays, an increasing number of service-providing enterprises make their services 
available via the Internet. User profiles and environmental conditions change frequently over time 
in a Web environment. This has raised new challenges to access control as well as user and 
resource administration [ALKA02].  Web services are protected by a variety of security services 
such as firewalls, encryption, access control mechanisms and network protocols.  They can be 
classified into two main categories: access control services that protect Internet resources from 
unauthorized use, and communication security services that ensure confidentiality and integrity of 
data transmitted over the network [JOSH01].  This section will introduce the key issues and 
challenges of access control in open and distributed environments.   We will also cover different 
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aspects of Web service access control including authentication, trust management, credential-
based access control, access control automation and policy specification.    
4.2.1 Access Control Requirements for Web Services 
Researchers [AGAR04a, AGAR04b, BHAT03a, BHAT04b, INDR04, JOSH01, YAO01] 
have proposed a set of requirements for Web service access control models. We highlight some of 
the important aspects as follows. 
● A generic and adaptive access control framework is required for Web service applications  
A Web service access control framework must be generic so that it can be applied to various 
Web service applications.  Implementation of the model should be easy and have minimal effect 
on the existing security mechanisms designed for specific problems.  
● Provide support for heterogeneous subjects and objects in Web service environment.  
Object heterogeneity refers to the diversity of system resources.  Subject heterogeneity is due 
to the dynamic nature of web-service users.  An Access control model must be able to support a 
large number and types of subjects and objects. 
● Access control should not rely on user identities.  
In Web environments, there are many new users and anonymous users. Hence, user identities 
are often unknown to the service provider, thus traditional authentication-based access control 
that requires the knowledge of user identity is not suitable for protecting Web services.   
CHAPTER 4. AN EXTENDED RBAC MODEL FOR WEB SERVICE APPLICATIONS 66 
● Enable automatic access control decision making based on dynamic conditions. 
Since Web-based enterprise resources are being exposed to a dynamic and distributed 
environment via Web services, it is necessary to have a dynamic and flexible access control 
model that captures changing security relevant information, such as user profiles and various 
environmental constraints at the time the access requests are made, and incorporate these into 
access control decisions. 
● Access control policies should be autonomously specified by service providers.  
Due to the distributed nature of the Web environment, security policies for Web services 
should be specified and administered autonomously by providers.  In other words, service 
providers should be able to determine the access control policies of the provided Web services 
independently, without any centralized control.    
● The framework should allow end users to check and prove their eligibility to use a Web 
service.  
This will be useful if a user has not yet provided enough information for the request to be 
granted, then he/she should be given an opportunity to provide the missing information.   
● Access control framework should support a range of access control policies.  
A wide range of security related conditions may affect authorization decisions. In order to 
support a variety of access control requirements, the ability of specifying more specific and 
complex security policies is becoming an indispensable part of successful access control.   
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4.2.2 Access Control in Web Environments 
Most of the existing access control models are designed for operating systems and databases.  
Their adaptability in Web environments has been under investigation. A good summary of 
existing access control frameworks was provided by Joshi et al. [JOSH01].  It compared a range 
of existing access control frameworks including, MAC, DAC, RBAC, WFMS (work-flow 
management system), TBAC (Task-based Access Control), agent-based approach and certificate-
based approaches, in order to find ideal access control models for Web-based applications. RBAC 
was found to be an attractive candidate for Web-based applications because of several well-
known advantages [JOSH01].  The RBAC model is known to be policy neutral, therefore it is 
capable of supporting a wide range of security policies including both MAC and DAC.  Most 
importantly, the RBAC model can be easily managed and adapted by enterprise applications, 
since the role concept can reduce the complexity of subject heterogeneity and security 
management works [SAND96, JOSH01].  However, Web-based applications have two salient 
features: they have a large number of users, and many users are previously unknown to the 
system.  Researchers have discovered that in such environments the traditional manually 
conducted identity-based user-to-role assignment is infeasible [ALKA02, AGAR04a]. The issues 
that face RBAC are assigning roles to previously unknown users, and automating role assignment 
based on a wide range of conditions apart from user identity.    
4.2.3 Credential-based Access Control and Dynamic Role Assignment 
Some alternative role assignment approaches have been proposed recently to address the 
challenges in multi-domain environments.  An appealing solution is to assign users to roles based 
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on credentials provided by users.  A credential provides security critical information in order to 
establish connections between different security entities. Traditionally, a credential consists of 
user identity for authentication, and user privileges for authorization.  To ensure the authenticity 
of a credential, it may be digitally signed by a trusted third party.  By using a trust management 
approach [BLAZ00], the reliance on user identity can be resolved.  A trust management 
framework can bind digitally signed certificates with user privileges directly instead of user 
identities [BLAZ00].  Such a framework is supported by Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) to 
ensure the authenticity of a credential.  User identities are then replaced by public keys.  This 
allows role assignment to be conducted according to the content of user credentials. The trust 
management framework by itself can only provide authentication, it cannot perform authorization 
since it is not designed to control user-to-system interactions.  Nevertheless, it can provide 
security relevant information for the subsequent authorization process.  
Herzberg et al. utilize trust management approach to support access control in a proposed 
Trust Establishment (TE) framework [HERZ00]. This framework automatically assigns business 
roles to strangers according to certificates provided by a trusted third party.  Each certificate is 
expressed as a predicate of the form cert (Issuer, Subject, Type, Field) indicating issuer of the 
certificate, the name of the subject, the type of the certificate and the attributes field of the 
certificate.  The TE system is built on top of PKI.  Later on, an extension of TE framework 
[ZHON01] was developed to include trustworthiness of the user and certificate issuer in role 
assignment.  The trustworthiness of the user is accumulated gradually over times and drops if the 
system believes that the user has done harmful actions or attempted harmful operations.  The 
trustworthiness of the certificate issuer is classified by the security administrator according to a 
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set of evaluation rules.  The authors argue that these trust-based factors should be used to 
determine which role is assigned to users.  Although this approach can simulate the real world 
assessment of trustworthiness, it also can lead to major security frauds in the system, since a 
malicious user may commit malicious acts after his/her trustworthiness has reached a certain level.    
Both the Trust Establishment (TE) framework [HERZ00] and its extension [ZHON01] rely 
on PKI infrastructure.  The problem is that the implementation of PKI infrastructure may affect 
the performance of the system, as the public-key operations involved are computationally 
expensive.  Furthermore, a PKI-based system can become the target of Denial of Service (DOS) 
attacks and be forced to repeatedly perform computationally expensive public-key operations 
needed for certain authentication or key exchange protocols.  Additionally, both the TE 
framework and its extension focus on role assignment based on the trust level of the user or 
certificate issuer omitting other types of role assignment conditions.   
A wider range of role activation1 rules is identified in OASIS (Open Architecture for Secure 
Inter-working Services) role-based access control framework [YAO01].  In this framework, role 
activation rules are classified into three categories: prerequisite roles, appointments, and 
constraints.   
● A prerequisite role must be activated before a target role can be activated. 
● Appointment occurs when a member of some roles grants a credential that will allow some 
users to activate another role.   
● Constraints can be used to define security policies such as SoD.   
1Role activation only refers to role assignment performed by the system in a session; whereas role 
assignment refers to both role assignment performed by a human administrator and role assignment 
automatically performed by the system in a session.  When no administrative role assignment is performed, 
role assignment and role activation mean the same thing. 
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In addition, roles can be activated and deactivated dynamically according to the conditions 
associated with role membership. A first-order predicate calculus is developed for the 
specification of the role activation rules.  However, among all role activation rules, the paper 
focuses on the discussion of appointment, and no detailed analysis on other types of activation 
rules is given.  
Rule-based RBAC (RB-RBAC) [ALKA02] also provides dynamic role assignment and 
revocation according to a set of rules.  Unlike OASIS RBAC [YAO01], it focuses on the 
importance of user attributes in the role assignment process.  The authors argue that user 
attributes can provide classifiable information for role assignment, thus they should be used as 
determining factors in role assignment.  A context-free grammar is used to express assignment 
rules along with the model.  Although both approaches suggest that a wide range of role 
assignment rules can be employed in role assignment, neither has provided a comprehensive 
analysis on the full ranges of role assignment rules.  
In the above extensions of RBAC, role assignments are no longer dependent on user 
identities but on a range of security relevant information like user attributes, enterprise policy and 
various constraints.  Compared with traditional role assignment approach, they are more flexible 
and adaptable in distributed environments.  They have provided non-identity-based access control 
for enterprise systems. User credential and user attributes are used in role assignment to simplify 
security administration and to automate the authorization process in enterprise environments.  
However, since OASIS RBAC [YAO01] and RB-RBAC [ALKA02] are designed for general 
enterprise systems, they have not considered the unique requirements of Web service access 
control.   
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A generic XML-based RBAC framework, X-GTRBAC (XML-based Generalized Temporal 
Role-based Access Control) [BHAT05], has recently been developed for multi-domain 
environments.  An XML-based specification language is used to represent security policies in 
order to achieve interoperability among different domains. X-GTRBAC follows a series of earlier 
results [BHAT03a, BHAT03b, BHAT04a, BHAT04b, BERT01c, BERT05] in the area of RBAC 
(particularly role assignment) and XML-based specification language.   
The first work in the series is X-RBAC -- an XML based RBAC policy specification 
framework [BHAT03a].  This framework aims to address two key challenges in Web service 
security: (i) to develop access control models that provide content-based and context-aware 
access; and (ii) to handle the heterogeneity of subjects and objects involved.  In order to achieve 
that, an XML-based specification language is used to define role, user, permission, user-to-role 
assignment and permission-to-role assignment as well as user credentials. Roles are dynamically 
activated for users based on their credentials supplied at the time of login, and content and context 
of security relevant information such as time, location and environmental state.  This allows role 
assignment for unknown users as long as they can supply the required security information and 
comply with a set of role activation rules.   
Based on a previous work [BHAT03a], a trust enhanced version of XML-based RBAC (X-
RBAC) framework was proposed [BHAT04b].  This extended X-RBAC incorporates context-
based access control with PKI infrastructure. To ensure authenticity of the context information, 
this framework uses trusted third parties (such as any PKI Certificate Authority) to provide trust 
management (TM).  The trust enhanced X-RBAC provides access control for the services 
requested by users.  “A service is an abstraction of the operations provided by system on its 
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resources” [BHAT03a].  A service request is defined as a triple (role, service, context); 
authorization is defined as a (role, service) pair.  Each context parameter is given as a structure 
(format) definition.  Algorithms are provided for access control decision making, expression 
evaluation and condition checking.   
The trust enhanced X-RBAC pays particular attention to the context of the security 
information.  The context parameters are formalized and are used in role assignment. The XML-
based authorization framework allows easy application of the existing XML-based architecture to 
Web service security.  Hence, the X-RBAC model provides a flexible and adaptive access control 
mechanism for Web services. However, neither of the papers [BHAT03a, BHAT04b] discussed 
the use of environmental conditions such as time, location and environmental state in role 
assignment.  
Temporal constraints can play an important role in dynamic role assignment. It was 
introduced in the Temporal Role-based Access Control (TRBAC) model [BERT01c] that 
provided dynamic role assignment based on temporal constraints like time periods, and periodic 
role enabling and disabling through role triggers.  This ensured that permissions assigned to the 
roles were only exercised within an appropriate time frame. TRBAC addressed temporal 
constraints for role activation only, and a more general model Generalized Temporal RBAC 
(GTRBAC) [BERT05] has been proposed for a wide range of temporal constraints.  These 
temporal constraints can be applied to roles, user-role-assignment, role-permission assignment as 
well as role activation.  In general, both models allow more flexible security policies to be 
specified, thus providing fine-grained dynamic access control for enterprise systems.  However, 
these two models have not addressed other types of authorization constraints besides duration 
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constraints.  Moreover, both TRBAC and GTRBAC rely on user identities for authentication, 
they do not support authentication and role assignment through user credentials provided by 
trusted third parties.   
X-RBAC has been further extended to include temporal constraints to form the initial version 
of X-GTRBAC [BHAT03b].  It also provides an interoperable, context-free XML-based grammar 
– X-Grammar to specify all concepts in GTRBAC.  A comprehensive version of X-GTRBAC 
[BHAT05] includes credential-based access control, context aware access control, temporal 
constraints and XML-based policy specification. The series of research conducted by Bhatti et al. 
[BHAT03a, BHAT03b, BHAT04b, BHAT05] covered many aspects of role activation conditions 
in a Web environment, and provided an XML-based specification language. The XML-based 
web-service policy specification has enabled information sharing between different domains that 
were previously unachievable due to incompatible information formats.   
4.2.4 Summary of Existing Work 
 Applying security models to Web services is a great challenge (refer to section 4.1). In order 
to resolve the problem of subject and object heterogeneity in Web environments, and provide an 
expressive and generic access control model, RBAC has been applied to Web service applications.  
RBAC model has several well-known advantages: it is policy neutral, and it can significantly 
simplify the administration and specification of security policies (refers to section 3.2, section 
4.2). However, many researchers have suggested that the traditional manually conducted identity-
based role assignment is difficult in an open distributed environment.   
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Hence, in some extensions of RBAC such as OASIS RBAC [YAO01], RB-RBAC 
[ALKA02], X-RBAC [BHAT03a] and X-GTRBAC [BHAT05], role assignment is automated 
according to user credentials and a wider range of role activation rules.   In these models, user 
credentials do not contain user identity any more, instead, security critical information such as 
user attributes, user capability and environmental conditions at the time of request are included. 
To ensure authenticity, user credentials may be supported by a trusted third party using a PKI-
based framework for trust management [BLAZ00, HERZ00, ZHON01]. This approach enabled 
the use of identity in Web environments.  Role activation rules are diversified: they may specify 
constraints on user attributes [ALKA02], trustworthiness of users or credential issuers [HERZ00, 
ZHON01], and environmental conditions (e.g. time, duration, location) [BHAT04b], or it can 
impose security policies (e.g. SoD, prerequisite role, cardinality) on roles and resources 
[YANG03, LIU04].   Since security information, like user attributes and environmental 
conditions, change frequently over time in Web environments, role assignment also becomes 
highly dynamic and adaptable to the changing environments.   
4.3 Authorization-function-based RBAC for Web Service 
Applications 
As we have discussed in the background section, the existing access control models are 
inadequate for addressing the unique security challenges in Web-services applications.  In this 
section, we propose an Extended Role-based Access Control (ERBAC) framework for Web 
Services.  ERBAC is an extension of the authorization-function-based role-based access control 
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model proposed in chapter 3, but includes new features like dynamic role assignment.  In addition, 
the proposed model will be presented in formal notations.  
4.3.1 Motivation 
In Web service environments, the problem of subject heterogeneity and object heterogeneity 
is more severe than in conventional enterprise environments. The notion of user is generalized.  It 
can be anything from a human user to a process, an application or a Web service.  In fact, 
computer-to-computer interaction has become an increasingly popular approach as well as 
traditional human-to-computer interaction.  User identity cannot provide an accurate measure of 
the privileges of the users.  In addition, many of these users are new to service providers.  This 
has posed a great challenge to security management in Web service applications. Traditional 
authentication-based access control systems that require manual security administration would be 
inadequate in such situations due to the large number of subjects and objects involved.   
The job of security administration must be automated in order to improve operation 
efficiency.  The FB-RBAC model proposed in chapter 3 is an ideal model for Web service 
applications.  It not only inherited all the advantages of RBAC96 but also simplified authorization 
specification using roles and authorization-functions. This has relieved the complexity raised by 
subject heterogeneity and object heterogeneity.   In addition, FB-RBAC utilized the concept of 
constraint to support fine-grained content-based access control.   However, both RBAC96 and 
FB-RBAC are authentication-based access control models.  In authentication-based access control, 
role assignment is manually performed by administrators according to user identities.  As we 
discussed in section 4.1.1 and 4.2.3, this type of role assignment is not suitable in the Web 
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environment, a credential-based approach was proposed in some of the recent models [HERZ00, 
YAO01].   
Credential-based role assignment has several advantages over the traditional identity-based 
approach.  First of all, users do not need to register with the provider in order to use the service it 
provides.  Secondly, user-to-role assignment is performed according to the security information 
provided in the credential, and no manual role assignment is required.  Therefore, if credential-
based access control is integrated with the FB-RBAC model, we can further reduce the 
administration work, and most importantly we will no longer rely on user identities for access 
control.  Moreover, credential-based approaches also play an important role in access control 
automation for a Web service application.   
4.3.2 A Credential-based Approach towards Web Service Access Control 
4.3.2.1 Access Control for Web Service Applications   
This section illustrates the structure of a Web service application, and indicates where 
application-level access control is applicable (Figure 4.1).  A Web service application can be 
divided into front-end, middle-tier or back-end according to the classic three-tier architecture.  
The front-end includes user and user interface, the middle-tier contains a list of Web services that 
are connected to back-end system resources through a set of functions, and the back-end usually 
consists of different types of data repositories.  Therefore, in order to provide controlled access to 
back-end system resources, it is necessary to provide access control mechanisms at the middle-
tier.  A credential-based FB-RBAC (is thereafter referred as extended RBAC) will be used to 
support application-level access control mechanisms in a Web service application.  Hence, the 
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problem of enabling different user communities to access and manipulate back-end system 
resources is now reduced to a simple problem, i.e. whether user credentials have enough 
capability to execute the A-functions of Web service applications in a safe and controlled manner. 
 
Figure 4.1 Access Control Mechanisms in a Web Service Application 
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4.3.2.2 Important Features of the Extended RBAC Model 
In this section, we will outline the important features of the ERBAC model, some of which 
are inherited from the FB-RBAC model. These inherited features are closely related to the new 
features presented in the ERBAC model.  
● Authorization-function-based (A-function) access control – a Web service can be described 
by a group of A-functions.  Therefore, A-function is still the basic unit of access control in 
ERBAC, and it is also used to represent permissions in authorization specifications.      
● Constraint-based access control – constraints form the basic components of access control 
policies.  Security policies such as Separation of Duty (SoD) can also be described by 
constraints. They are heterogeneous: time, location, number and temporal conditions all can 
be used as constraints. On the other hand, constraints can be applied to a variety of concepts 
such as role, A-function, attributes of the A-function and user capability.   
● Content-based access control – content-based access control can be specified in many 
contexts. We focus on the content of the input and output parameters of an authorization-
function.  The contents of input parameters is provided upon user requests, and it determines 
what resources are accessed at the back-end. The content of the output parameters may reveal 
confidential information to the user. Therefore, in order to provide controlled access to back-
end resources, the contents of the input and output parameters should be included in access 
control decision making.   In addition, by controlling the contents of input and output 
parameters of an A-function, fine-grained access control can be realized for user-to-system 
interactions.  
● Fine-grained access control – a Web service can be described by a number of A-functions, 
and an A-function has a number of parameters. However, a user may not have access to all A-
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functions of a Web service or all parameters of an A-function.  Partial access can be provided 
by introducing Web service instances and A-function instances.  The granularity of access 
control will not be limited to complete Web services or A-functions, but instances of Web 
services and instances of A-functions.  Together with content-based access control, Web 
service access control can be performed in a fine-grained manner.     
● Credential based access control – a possible alternative to authentication based access control 
is to use credentials provided by a trusted third party. It can enforce access control without 
knowing the user’s identity.  In Web service environments, the user is represented by user 
credentials.   In our proposed model, a user credential must contain user capabilities for the 
target Web service.  In order to access system resources, user capability will be used to 
activate different instances of the Web service.  As a result, different users will observe 
different instances of the same Web service in different sessions. 
● Least Privilege Principle – many access control models do not enforce the least privileged 
principle.  The principle of least privilege states that users should only be granted privileges 
when they have justifiable needs. The proposed ERBAC model will strictly enforce the least 
privilege principle in role assignment, so that only the least privileged role is assigned to the 
user request.  
● Dynamic role assignment – dynamic role assignment is dependent on all the above-mentioned 
features.  In Web environments, access control decision making ought to be automated 
according to a variety of dynamic conditions.  These conditions include user credentials, the 
contents of the input and output parameters of the A-function and a variety of constraints 
(least privilege principle can be seen as a type of constraint).  Dynamic role assignment will 
save manual administrative work of specifying authorizations for each security subject 
against each security object, hence making security management simpler and more efficient.    
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Out of all these features, the A-function-based access control, content-based access control 
and constraint-based access control are inherited from the FB-RBAC model, and fine-grained 
access control is the aggregating result of the three.  These features will also play important roles 
in access control of Web services.  Credential-based access control, enforcement of least privilege 
principle and dynamic role assignment are the new features added to the proposed ERBAC model. 
They will be discussed in detail in this chapter.   
4.3.2.3 Credential-based Access Control for Web Service Applications 
In RBAC models, role assignment is an essential part of the access control process, since its 
outcome directly affects whether or not a request is granted.  Security policies and enterprise 
business rules are also enforced through role assignment.  When no user identities are available 
for authentication and authorization, we will assume that a digitally signed credential [BLAZ00, 
HERZ00] is provided, which includes user capability towards the target Web service.  In such 
circumstances, a user request will be granted if the user capabilities provided can be mapped into 
a privileged role -- this role has permission to access the requested Web services/A-functions. On 
top of that, all other role assignment rules should be satisfied.  In the FB-RBAC model, role 
assignment is based on a wide range of rules, such as the input and output of user requests, 
constraints imposed on role and A-functions, environmental conditions and well-known security 
policies.  It is essential that the dynamic environmental conditions are taken into consideration 
during access control decision making in Web service applications. This allows access control to 
be more flexible and adaptable to the environment.    When the FB-RBAC model is applied to the 
Web environments, the notion of user is replaced by user credentials (see Figure 4.2).   
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Figure 4.2 Credential-Based FB-RBAC Model for Web Service Applications 
4.3.3 Dynamic Role Assignment in Web Environments  
4.3.3.1 Terms and Concepts Involved in Role Assignment 
This section introduces the concepts and terms that are used to define role assignment.    
● Web Service 
A Web service application consists of a set of Web services.  Each Web service is designed to 
perform a group of related tasks.  For instance, a typical Web service would be “Order Book 
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Online”. Each Web service consists of a set of A-functions, such as searchBook(), 
searchCustomer() and submitOrder() to carry out designated tasks.   
● Authorization-function  
Each Authorization-function (A-function) performs one or more operations on back-end 
resources. It contains a set of input parameters and a set of output parameters.  For example, A-
function searchBook() takes Book Name as input and returns Book ID, Book Price and Stock as 
outputs.  In our extended RBAC model, the basic unit of access control is set to A-function 
instead of individual resources at the back-end.   
● Web Service Instance 
A Web service instance contains a subset of the A-functions that are assigned to the Web 
service.  It is possible that different instances of the Web service differ not only in A-functions 
provided but also in the parameters of the A-functions.  We therefore use the term A-function 
instance to represent A-functions that differ in their parameter sets.     
● Authorization-function Instance 
The instances of an A-function may only have a subset of the parameters of the A-function.  
For example, in the case of Web service “Order Book Online”, A-function searchCustomer() 
takes Customer Name as the input, and returns Customer Address, Telephone number and Credit 
Limit.  However, a fine-grained access control policy may specify that the user cannot view the 
customer’s Credit Limit.  This can be achieved by controlling the output parameters of the A-
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function.  Therefore, a particular instance of the Web service “Order Book on the Internet” can be 
described with a set of attributes including the A-function it provides and the parameters of the A-
function.  These descriptions will allow the system to carry out fine-grained access control based 
on the attributes of the A-function. 
● User Credential (or User Capability) 
User credential can be used to represent the service requesting agent.  It contains user 
capability and some other security related information.  In this thesis, we will only consider user 
capability since it is the determining factor in role assignment.  It provides a set of permissions to 
access Web services and the A-functions in each of the Web services. 
● Role  
A set of Web service instances specified by A-functions and A-function parameters is 
assigned to each role.  Inheritance relationships may exist between different roles, such as a 
senior role inherits all privileges of a junior role.   
● Constraint 
Constraints are conditions that must be satisfied in authorizations. They can be imposed on 
various concepts of RBAC model, and are used either as preconditions or obligations.  
Preconditions are conditions that must be satisfied before any action is taken, such as granting 
access to a user. Obligations are rules that must be followed by an action, such as constraining the 
way a request is executed.         
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4.3.3.2 Role Assignment in Web Service Applications 
In the ERBAC model, role assignment will be carried out twice to ensure the least privileged 
principle is strictly followed (refer to Figure 4.3).   
 
Figure 4.3 Role Assignments in Web Service Applications 
The first role assignment provides a role according to user capability before any requests are 
made.  It is designed to identify the capability of the user.  The role assigned to the user capability 
will then indicate the maximum privilege that the user will have in this session.  This role is 
called “capability role”.  However, not all privileges provided in the user capability need to be 
exercised for each user request.  The second role assignment is conducted at the time of the 
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request.  It is mainly based on the content of the request hence is called “request role”.  The role 
assignment engine will assign a less privileged role (compared with the role assigned to the user 
capability) to each user request.  This ensures that privileges are not misused.  Both role 
assignments are constrained by a set of role assignment rules.  In the following section, we take 
an algorithmic approach to describe the role assignment process in detail. 
4.3.3.3 Assigning Roles to User Capabilities 
In the initial role assignment (shown in Figure 4.4), matchmaking is performed between the 
user capabilities and the privileges assigned to the role.   
 
Figure 4.4 Role Assignment for User Capability  
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Both user capability and role privileges are specified as permissions to access Web service 
instances and/or A-function instances.   The rule of this initial role assignment can be specified as 
follows.  If the user capability subsumes the privileges of a role, then this role may be assigned to 
a particular user capability, and it becomes a candidate of the capability role.  While there may be 
more than one candidate role, the process attempts to find the most privileged role among all 
candidate roles.  The most privileged role is calculated by comparing the weight of the role.   The 
total weight of the role is the sum of the weight of A-functions assigned to that role.  Each A-
function is assigned a weight according to its importance in the applications.  Usually A-functions 
that write to the back-end database are assigned more weight than A-functions that simply read 
data from the database.  The resultant role will be the role that has the most weight assigned to it. 
It is assumed that a role hierarchy is established among different roles. The full permission of a 
role includes all permissions inherited from its junior roles.  The following algorithm generates a 
capability role for a particular user capability. 
Algorithm 1 – Generating a Capability Role 
Input: user capability, a set of predefined roles (role setp); 
Output: the capability role; 
{ 
add all permissions specified by the user capability be permission 
setuc; 
 for each role (rolek) in role setp 
 { 
add all permissions of rolek to permission setr; 
if permission setuc subsumes permission setr and all 
constraint checks are satisfied, 
then add rolek to the candidate role set (role setc); 
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}  
let the most privileged role (rolep) to be role1 in role setc; 
for each role (rolei) in role setc  
{ 
if the weight of rolei is greater than the weight of rolep,  
then let rolep to be rolei;  
 } 
 return rolep (the capability role); 
} 
We call the resultant role generated from the initial role assignment “capability role”, since it 
is mapped to user capability.  Nevertheless, the capability role is also constrained by a set of rules 
(discussed in section 4.3.3) when exercising its privilege such as SoD and cardinality.  These 
constraints determine whether a role will be assigned to the user and which one of these roles will 
be assigned to the user.   
4.3.3.4 Assigning Roles to User Requests  
The subsequent role assignment (shown in Figure 4.5) is conducted at the time of request. It 
is mainly based on the user request and the capability role. In order to strictly enforce the least 
privilege principle, a least privileged role will be assigned to each user request.  We call this role 
a “request role”. This role is selected from the junior roles of the capability role. It grants users 
with the permissions to access the requested A-function.  Since the capability role has identified 
the maximum privilege of the user, all request roles possess only a subset of the privileges owned 
by the capability role.  This second role assignment is also constrained by a variety of security 
rules (more details will be presented in section 4.3.4).  The generation of the request role strictly 
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follows the least privilege principle.  This ensures no excess privileges are granted to each user 
request.  Figure 4.5 shows how a request role is generated.  
 
Figure 4.5 Role Assignment for User Request  
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Algorithm 2 – Generating of a Request Role 
Input:  User request (to a Web service/A-function), capability role 
(rolep); 
Output: the request role; 
{ 
add all junior roles of the capability role (rolep) to role setj; 
for each role (rolei) in role setj   
{ 
add all privileges of rolei to privilege seti; 
for each privilege (privilegek) in privilege seti  
{ 
if privilegek is equivalent to the user request; 
   then add rolei to role setr; 
  } 
}  
let the least privileged role (roles) be role1 in role setr;  
for each role (rolem) in role setr  
{ 
if the weight of rolem is less than the weight of rolep; 
then let roles to be rolem; 
 } 
 return roles (the request role); 
} 
4.3.4 Constraint-based Access Control 
4.3.4.1 Using Constraints to Support Access Control of Web Service Applications 
In the previous chapter (section 3.3.2), we discussed how various constraints were used to 
provide access control for generic enterprise applications.  Constraint-based access control 
describes a variety of security policies by imposing constraints on different components of the 
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RBAC model and on a range of environmental factors. For example, SoD and Chinese wall can 
be implemented by imposing constraints on user-to-role assignment, or on permission-to-role 
assignment.  In this section, constraints are used to provide fine-grained access control for Web 
service applications. The existing RBAC models [ALKA02, BHAT03a, BHAT05, YAO01] have 
identified a variety of role assignment rules ranging from the properties of a user to 
environmental conditions at the time of request. In the ERBAC model, apart from user capability 
and user request, access control in a Web environment is also constrained by a variety of 
conditions.  All the aforementioned access control requirements and conditions can be described 
as RBAC constraints. Constraints are classified into different categories according to their 
definitions, such as content-based, environmental-based, history-based and temporal constraints 
as shown in section 3.3.3.  They can be applied to different parts of the extended FB-RBAC 
model, such as user-capability, role, A-function and role assignment. In this thesis, constraints are 
generally used for three purposes.  
● They can decide which role should be activated. For example, a particular set of user 
capability may be assigned to a day shift role between 9am – 5pm, and a night shift role for 
the rest of the day.    
● They can determine whether or not the role should be activated. For example, a constraint 
may specify that a particular role cannot be activated for more than ten users at the same time.  
This is an example of cardinality constraint.   
● They can constrain what roles can or cannot do.  For example, a constraint may specify that a 
particular role can only access its own information record.  
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 In the first two cases, constraints are used in role assignment.  They may be called pre-
conditions.  In the third case, the constraints are applied after a role has been assigned.  They may 
be called post-conditions.  For example, in a Web-based bookstore service, a particular role can 
only access its own information record.  Constraints are imposed on the content of the input 
parameters of the A-function in the same way that constraints are applied in the FB-RBAC model.  
We argue that the contents of user input and output are essential to realize fine-grained access 
control.  For example, we may specify that an ordinary user can only read his/her own account 
information.  The input parameter – customer name, of the A-function searchCustomer() is then 
restricted to a certain value, for example to “John”.   Whereas if Mary, an employee of the online 
book store, will be given full privileges for the Web service, including access to all customer 
account information.    
4.3.4.2 Using Constraints and Authorization-functions to Support Separation of Duty  
Constraints can also be used to define well-known security policies such as Separation of 
Duty (SoD).  SoD is designed to prevent users from performing tasks that have conflict of interest. 
It can be classified into static SoD and dynamic SoD.  In static cases, mutually exclusive roles 
cannot co-exist in a set of roles assigned.  With dynamic SoD, a user may be assigned mutually 
exclusive roles, but they cannot be activated at the same time in a session.   
Static SoD is used when administrators manually assign users to roles, which is not suitable 
for dynamic role assignment in Web environments.  In this section, we focus on dynamic SoD as 
it can be applied to the role assignment process described in the ERBAC model.  The traditional 
SoD policy is represented by defining mutually exclusive roles. However, not all privileges 
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assigned to mutually exclusive roles are in conflict.  Such implementation may end up preventing 
users from exercising some of their legitimate privileges.  For example, a clerk role and an 
accountant role cannot be activated at the same time, because these two roles perform the 
conflicting tasks of “request for credit update” and “update credit limit”.  But mutual exclusivity 
between the conflicting roles of clerk and accountant also means that none of the other 
permissions granted to these two roles can be exercised at the same time.  Hence, we argue that 
mutually exclusive roles are not suitable for defining SoD.  
ORBAC [YANG03] uses a less privileged role -- task role to specify SoD (refer to section 
4.2).   Task role is more precise than conventional role, but it is still not the best option for 
describing SoD for a particular task.  Compared with roles, the notion of A-function is a more 
straightforward term for describing SoD, since it represents a single permission rather than a set 
of permissions owned roles.  By adopting an A-function-based approach, the principle of SoD can 
be realized by defining mutually exclusive A-functions.  This new way of describing SoD not 
only prevents conflicting tasks from being performed at the same time, but also avoids possible 
service repudiation during the access control process.    
4.3.5 Formal Definition of the Concepts  
The existing models have provided a range of formal specifications for security policies, such 
as first-order predicate logic [YAO01], context-free grammar based RB-RBAC language 
[ALKA02], policy algebra [WANG04] and constraint logic programming [BARK03].  These 
policy specification formalisms are specified in high-level logic expressions using predicates and 
mathematical symbols.  In this section, we will also provide formal definitions for each of the 
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concepts and relation using mathematical symbols and predicates.  A set of security objects 
involved in access control is defined below. In this specification, an upper case letter denotes a set 
of elements, a lower case letter denotes single element. 
● Web Service  
Web Service Set: WS = {ws1, …., wsk}, where wsi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is a Web service. 
● Web Service Instance  
Web Service Instance Set: WSI = {wsi1, …., wsik} where WSIi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is a Web service 
instance.  
● A-function 
A-function Set: F = {f1, …., fk} where fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is an A-function, each A-function fi has 
weight wfi according to its importance.  
● A-function Instance  
A-function Instance Set: FI = {fi1, …., fik} where FIi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is a A-function instance. 
The relationships between the above defined concepts are presented below: 
● Web service wsi consists of a set of A-functions: Fi =  {f1, …., fm}, where fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m is an 
A-function. 
● Web service wsi has a set of instances WSIi = {wsi1, …., wsik}, where WSIi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is a 
Web service instance. 
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● Web service instance wsii is an instance of Web service wsi, it consists of a set of A-functions 
instances: FI = {fi1, …., fin} where fii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a A-function, n is the number of A-
functions in Web service instance wsii,  n ≤ m, FI ⊆ F. 
● Each A-function fk has a set of input parameters IP = {ip1, …., ipm} where ipi, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, is 
the name of the input parameter, and a set of output parameters OP = {op1, …., opn} where 
opi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, is the name of the output parameter. 
● Each instance of A-function fk, namely fik has as a set of input parameters SIP, where 
SIP ⊆ IP, and a set of output parameters SOP, where SOP ⊆ OP. 
The definition of the basic components of role-based access control such as user (now 
represented by user capability and user request), role and permission will be based on the 
concepts and relations defined above. 
● User Capability 
User capability contains a set of (permissions to) Web service instances WSIuc = {wsi1, …., 
wsik}, where wsii, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is a Web service instance.  Each Web service instance wsii 
corresponds to a unique Web service wsi, and so no two Web service instances in WSIuc are the 
instances of the same Web service.  
● User request  
A user request can be defined as a pair (rf, IPV), where rf is the A-function that the user 
requests to access, and IPV is a set of input = {ipv1, …., ipvm}, where ipvi, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, is the value 
of the input parameter.  
CHAPTER 4. AN EXTENDED RBAC MODEL FOR WEB SERVICE APPLICATIONS 95 
● Role  
A set of roles can be defined as R = {r1, …., rk) where ri, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, is a role, each role ri is 
assigned a weight wri, where wri =  wf1 + wf2 + …. + wfk, which is the total weight of the A-
functions assigned to the role.  Each role ri is assigned a set of permissions, which is also defined 
as a set of Web service instances, WSIrp, and a set of constraints applied to the role Crp, thus ri 
can be described as a triple (WSIrp, Crp, wri). 
● Seniority of the role 
A role rs is a senior role of role rj, if WSIj ⊆ WSIs, where WSIs is the permission assigned to 
rs and WSIj the permission assigned to rj, they are denoted as rs SeniorTo rj. At the same time, 
role rj is a junior role of role rs, which is represented by rj JuniorTo rs Seniority of the role is used 
to represent the inheritance relationship among predefined roles. 
● Service request 
A service request is acting on behalf of a particular user towards an A-function or a Web 
service.  It is represented as a triple (R, F, IPV), where R is the role assigned to the user, and F is 
the A-function to be accessed, IPV is the set of input parameters initiated by the user which is 
defined as {ipv1, …., ipvm}, where ipvi, 0 ≤ i ≤ m, is the value of the input parameter,  
● Constraint 
Constraints are heterogeneous, we will define constraints using the following parameters: (1) 
constraint ID (CID); (2) the security concept it has imposed on (CC), such as constraints on role, 
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constraints on A-function and constraints on permission; (3) what purpose it is used for (CP) 
(refer to section 4.3.4) such as to decide which role is activated (category 1), to determine 
whether a role should be activated (category 2), constrain what roles can or cannot do (category 
3); and (4) the content of the constraints (CO).  A set of constraints can be represented as C = 
{C1, …., Ck} where Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ k is a constraint, it can be defined by a tuple (CID, CC, CP,  CO). 
Having formally defined all the concepts and relations involved in the proposed model, we 
will elaborate the access control of Web service using the set of notations provided.  
In a generic case, user A requests to access A-function fk in Web service wsi, the capability of 
the user is defined to be WSIuc, and user request is defined as (rf, IPV).  The first step is to 
identify Web service instance wsii that is an instance of the requested Web service wsi in set 
WSIuc.   
Once Web service instance wsii is found, it will be mapped to the capability role which 
indicates the capability of user A in a particular session.  Given a set of predefined roles R, each 
assigned with a triple (WSIrp, Crp, wri).  The role assignment engine generates a set of roles 
denoted by Rc = {r1, …., rk), each ri, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, is assigned with a triple (WSIrpi, Crpi , wrii), where 
wsii ∈WSIrpi, and Crpi is satisfied.  Within this set of Roles Rc, the most privileged capability role 
rc can be found by identifying the role that has the largest weight among all in Rc.   
For each user request defined by (rf, IPV), a request role rr will be assigned to it.  Role rr has 
to be a junior role of the capability role rc.  Role rc has a set of junior roles Rs, in which a subset 
of them, Rsj can access the requested A-function rf, and also satisfy the constraints defined.  The 
least privileged role to the user request will be derived by calculating the weight of each role ri in 
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set Rsj.  The resultant role rr are assigned to the user request.  Thus, the service access request will 
be formed by a triple (rr, rf, IPV).  
The service access request triple (rr, rf, IPV) will be evaluated against a set of constraints 
(post-conditions), before the access to the A-function rf is allowed.   
4.4 Discussion and Future Work 
The proposed ERBAC model provides application-level access control for Web service 
applications.  Since traditional security infrastructure requires proof of identity and centralized 
control, they are not suitable in Web environment.  The proposed role assignment in ERBAC is 
based on user credentials provided at the time of request instead of user identities registered with 
the system.  By taking a credential-based approach, ERBAC is capable of handling dynamic and 
anonymous users typical in Web service applications.  Role assignment is automated in ERBAC 
and uses a set of predefined rules.  These role assignment rules include dynamic security 
information such as user credentials, temporal constraints and environmental conditions.  The 
automation of role assignment has not only relieved security administration work such as manual 
assignment of users to roles, but also allowed access control to be consistent with frequently 
changing user profiles and environment profiles.  The problem of heterogeneous users and 
resources involved in the identity-based manual role assignment has now been looked after by an 
automated role assignment mechanism.  Moreover, ERBAC has inherited all the advantages of 
FB-RBAC proposed in chapter 3.  One of these advantages is that roles and authorization-
functions used in FB-RBAC and ERBAC are more expressive and meaningful representations of 
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security subjects and security objects involved in authorizations and security policies than in other 
methods.  This allows security administration and specification to be greatly simplified.  
Therefore, when credential-based dynamic role assignment is integrated with authorization-
function-based access control, the problem of subject and object heterogeneity involved in both 
role assignment and security management can be resolved.  The credential-based role assignment 
has avoided the dependency on user identities in the access control process, and at the same time 
it has automated access control decision making. 
ERBAC is more comprehensive than the existing credential-based access control models 
[HERZ00, ZHON01, YAO01, ALKA02, BHAT05] since it has used constraints to support 
dynamic role assignment.  The notion of constraint can be used to describe any types of security 
policies, but its full usefulness is not exploited in the existing RBAC models.  In our model, a 
constraint is applied to many areas of access control for various reasons.  For example, a 
constraint can be imposed on the input and output parameters of the authorization-function to 
facilitate fine-grained access control for Web service applications.  In addition, the model also 
strictly enforces the least privilege principle on role assignment to ensure only necessary 
privileges are granted to users.   
ERBAC provides fine-grained access control for Web service applications by presenting 
different users with different interfaces according to the credential provided at the time of request 
and various environmental factors.  These user interfaces not only differ in the A-functions they 
provide but also in the parameters of the A-functions.  By imposing constraints on the content of 
the input and output parameters, we can enforce finer-grained control based on the information 
being provided.  Moreover, security policies like SoD are also implemented in a fine-grained 
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manner.  Mutually exclusive authorization-A-functions are defined instead of defining mutually 
exclusive roles in SoD.  Authorization-function is more specific and meaningful than the notion 
of role for describing conflict of interest. 
ERBAC provides a set of formal notations to define concepts and relations involved, so that 
authorizations and security policies can be specified formally. This formal notation set can be 
easily extended and updated.  It is capable of describing a variety of access control scenarios.  
However, this formal notation uses high level logic expressions; hence it is not machine-
understandable.  In order to achieve interoperability, it must be represented by policy 
specification languages like XML-based languages or ontology-based languages. 
Certain issues are beyond the scope of this thesis.  For example, we have not addressed 
security information apart from user capability in the discussion of user credentials.  A user 
credential can carry more security information than just user capabilities such as features of the 
user, credential issuer.  In a dynamic Web environment, the content of user credentials also 
should vary according to the access control requirements of a particular Web service application.  
Furthermore, there is no comprehensive analysis on different types of constraints.  In this chapter, 
we have only considered the simplest case of a Web service.  In reality, a Web service may be 
composite in which one Web service interrelates with a number of other Web services.  In such 
situations, access control needs to consider the interrelationship between the Web services.  
Moreover, this model has not taken into the consideration the latest developments of the Semantic 
Web.  The Semantic Web is a new form of Web content that can be interpreted by software. It 
provides a common framework for data to be shared and reused across application, enterprise, 
and community boundaries.  Thus it may be widely adopted by future Web service applications.    
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In the future, we may consider different types of security information that can be stored in 
user credentials in addition to user capability.  Moreover, the dynamic composition of user 
credentials based on access control requirements of target Web services may be investigated.  
Further investigation is also required for different types of constraints and their applications.  Due 
to the increasing popularity of the Semantic Web, there is a need to develop access control 
models that are in line with the development of the Semantic Web.  We will address the access 
control problem for Semantic Web services in chapter 5.   
4.5 Summary and Conclusion  
In this chapter, we presented an application-level access control model, ERBAC, for Web 
service applications.  We described the application of the proposed model to Web service 
applications.  This model has inherited the features of the FB-RBAC model proposed in chapter 3.  
Web services are described by A-functions and A-functions are used as the basic access control 
unit and to represent permissions.  The new features of ERBAC include credential-based access 
control and dynamic role assignment.  The notion of user was represented by user credentials 
instead of user identities.  The user credentials provided user capabilities for subsequent 
authentication and authorization.  Role assignment was made dynamic according to a variety of 
conditions including user credentials provided by a trusted third party and a set of constraint-
based security policies.  Security policies are represented by a variety of constraints and involve 
dynamic environmental factors.    This model also provides fine-grained access control by using 
Web service instances and A-function instances to realize partial access.  The least privilege 
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principle is strictly enforced throughout the role assignment process to eliminate security.  We 
also showed that constraints like separation of duty policy can be more precisely implemented 
under ERBAC.   Finally, formal specifications were used to define concepts and relations 
involved in the proposed model.     
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Chapter 5  
An Ontology-based Access Control Model 
for Semantic Web Services 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is an extension of the research conducted in chapter 4 and focuses on providing 
access control for Semantic Web services.  The Semantic Web has attracted a great deal of 
attention, since it describes Web resources in machine-processable metadata and these metadata 
will allow software agents or search engines to find and interpret Web content more quickly and 
precisely.  The core of the Semantic Web is ontology, a proven description technique that is used 
to represent concepts and their relations.  “Under the Semantic Web, Web pages are annotated by 
concepts and relations that are formally defined by ontologies” [QIN03].  The Semantic Web has 
many advantages over the traditional Web.  For example, it supports automatic reasoning ability 
for Web resources and Web services.  Moreover, by using Semantic Web pages, it will be 
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possible to automatically query and extract meaningful content from these Web pages.  Due to the 
extreme variation in the information presented by different systems/services, the Semantic Web 
can play an important role by providing common frameworks for data to be shared and reused 
across applications, enterprises, and community boundaries [SEMA01].   Semantic Web service 
is an essential part of the Semantic Web development.  It is built on top of the OWL-based Web 
Service Ontology, OWL-S (formerly DAML-S), and is used to support tools and agent 
technology to enable automation of services on the Semantic Web. It is envisaged that semantic 
Web services can be used in the following areas [SWSA]:  
● B2B – Facilitate business to business (B2B) communication in Enterprise Integration 
Systems. 
● Web – Provide ability to query, discover and combine Web services dynamically based on 
the requirements of software agents. 
● Agent – Semantic Agent-oriented organization can provide planning and control or 
coordination for large heterogeneous organizations, such as logistics. 
● Grid – Semantic Web services can be useful in Scientific Grid Computing, an emerging 
technology for widely distributed large-scale heterogeneous computing.  
● Ubiquitous – Ubiquitous Computing efforts focus on the emerging area of wireless 
computing, and the use of portable devices to tap into a variety of spatially proximate 
computing services in a very context-specific fashion. Semantic service descriptions can 
provide common understandings between spatially proximate computing services. 
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However, security, trust and privacy issues of Semantic Web services are mainly unsolved 
[SEMA].  In the next section, we will identify some of the main security issues related to 
semantic Web services.   
5.1.1 Problem Statement 
Access control of Semantic Web services is a challenging issue, as it not only faces the 
problem of conventional Web services but also the problems arise from the Semantic Web.  We 
mentioned in chapter 4 that access control of Web services should be performed automatically 
according to a set of conditions such as user credentials, user requests and some environmental 
conditions in the Web environment.  The development of the Semantic Web has made 
information sharing and automatic service discovery possible through the use of ontology.  The 
problem with Semantic Web services is that they are specified by ontologies like DAML-S or 
OWL-S.  Access control automation cannot be achieved without a Semantic Web compatible 
security framework.  However, current research on Semantic Web service security has focused on 
matchmaking between the capabilities of Web service requesters and the requirements of Web 
service providers.  Research in the area of semantic Web security is still at its primary stage.      
5.1.2 Outline of the Proposed Solution 
To provide automated access control for Semantic Web services, we need to establish a 
security framework that is in line with the Semantic Web.   In this chapter, an ontology-based 
access control model is presented for Semantic Web services.  The proposed model applies 
ontology to the Extended Role-based Access Control (ERBAC) model (presented in chapter 4) 
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with the objective of bridging the gap between access control services and the concepts 
represented in ontologies such as the Semantic Web, and to provide automated reasoning ability 
in the access control decisions-making process.  ERBAC model has two important aspects: 
credential-based access control and dynamic role assignment.  These two aspects enabled 
dynamic access control according to user capabilities and a set of access control policies.  Since 
ontology is core to the Semantic Web, providing an ontology-based description for ERBAC 
model will allow security services to be integrated with Semantic Web services.  Such integration 
will facilitate automatic reasoning for access control of Semantic Web services.    
This ontology-based framework represents concepts and relations involved in ERBAC in 
several different types of ontologies.   Each component of ERBAC will be defined in a separate 
ontology, for example, role ontology, policy ontology or process ontology.  These ontologies 
describe the attributes of the component and its relationship with other concepts in the model.   
The role assignment process will be represented by a process ontology that implements the two 
role assignment algorithms presented in sections 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4.   The role assignment 
ontology will take input described by the user ontology, the role ontology, and the permission 
ontology, and return roles as an output.  The process is also restricted by the constraints specified 
by the constraint ontology.    This process ontology provides a semantic description for the 
dynamic role assignment process that allows role assignment to be performed by semantic 
reasoning.  
In addition, a formal semantic policy representation framework is developed as an integral 
part of the ontology-based RBAC framework.  This policy representation framework is derived 
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from ontologies developed for the ERBAC model. It uses the syntax and vocabulary of a Web 
ontology language (OWL) to specify access control policies represented by ontologies.   
5.1.3 Summary of Contributions 
The proposed Ontology-Based ERBAC (OB-ERBAC) model employs ontology and ontology 
language to support semantic Web services and resources represented in ontologies.  It is the first 
step towards a complete ontology-based access control model.  By applying ontology to the 
ERBAC model, in particular to the role assignment process and to the role assignment rules, we 
provide automatic reasoning ability for access control decision making.  Moreover, an ontology-
based semantic policy framework has been developed that allows security policies to be 
understandable across multi-domain environment.    
5.1.4 Structure of the Chapter 
In section 5.2, we analyse related works in the area of semantic Web security.  Ontology and 
ontology-based language are introduced to the readers as background information with the focus 
on an access control model for Semantic Web and semantic policy representation framework.    
Section 5.3 presents the Ontology-Based Extended Role-based Access Control (OB-ERBAC) 
model.  We will analyse the Extended Role-based Access Control (ERBAC) model and apply 
ontology techniques to describe it.  A formal policy representation framework is developed along 
with the model.  Section 5.4 discusses the advantages and limitations of the OB-ERBAC model, 
and possible improvements in the future.  Section 5.5 provides a summary of the chapter.  
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5.2 Background 
There are several challenges in developing an access control model for the semantic Web, as 
was described in section 5.1.2.  The first one is to specify and enforce security policies over 
concepts defined in ontologies.  The second one is to represent security policies in a formal policy 
representation framework, in order to resolve syntactic and semantic discrepancies in a multi-
domain environment.  This section will first provide some background knowledge on the 
Semantic Web, ontology and ontology languages.   It will then review some important work in 
the area of access control for the semantic Web and formal policy representation framework in 
relation to the challenges mentioned above. 
5.2.1 The Semantic Web 
The Semantic Web has been introduced to define a machine-interpretable web, and it is 
targeted for automation, integration and reuse of data across different applications [QIN03].  The 
Semantic Web is based on the Resource Description Framework (RDF), which integrates a 
variety of applications using XML for syntax and URI (Universal Resource Indicators) for 
naming.  Ontology is the basic component of the semantic web, since it can define and connect 
the concepts used to describe security relevant information on the Web.  By using Semantic Web 
annotations, Web-based information and services become accessible and understandable to a 
variety of agents and applications.     
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5.2.2 Ontology 
Ontology is an ancient Greek philosophical term meaning “a specification of a 
conceptualization” [GRUB].  In the Artificial Intelligence (AI) world, ontology is defined as “the 
term used to describe and represent an area of knowledge” [OWL-a].   Due to the semantic 
discrepancies between services within scalable, open distributed environments, ontology has been 
used to provide formal semantic descriptions for Web content and services.  Ontology vocabulary 
sits on top of an XML schema and RDF schema.   Ontologies like DAML-S, OWL can provide a 
rich description of the terminology, concepts, and the relationships among those concepts relevant 
to a particular domain or area of interest [SAND].   Different types of ontologies are used for 
different purposes. 
● Role-based ontologies define terminology and concepts relevant to a particular user, person 
or application.  
● Process ontologies define input, output, constraints, relationships, terms, and sequencing 
information relevant to a particular business process or a set of processes. 
● Domain ontologies define the terminology and concepts relevant to a particular topic. 
● Interface ontologies define the structure and content restrictions relevant to a particular 
interface such as an API, database, scripting language, or content type. 
Ontology differs from an XML schema in that it is a knowledge representation, not a message 
format [OWLb].  Moreover, it also provides richer semantics than XML schema for formal 
representation of knowledge.  Since ontology-based specification allows data to be shared, reused 
and queried among different domains, they can be used to achieve a common understanding 
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between different formalisms and enable interoperability, and consequently automatic reasoning 
and querying for Web services can be realized through ontologies [OWLb]. 
5.2.3 The Application of Ontology in Semantic Web Services 
As a part of semantic Web development, semantic Web services are described by ontologies 
like DAML-S and OWL-S.  OWL-S (formerly DAML-S) is an ontology of services that describes 
Web services at the application-level, and complements the various industry efforts at the lower 
level.  By using OWL-S, Web services providers will have a core set of markup language 
constructs for describing the properties and capabilities of their Web services in unambiguous, 
computer-intepretable form, and users and software agents will acquire the ability to discover, 
invoke, compose and monitor Web resources with high degree of automation [DAML-S, OWL-S].  
OWL-S consists of three main parts: service profile, process model and service grounding (Figure 
5.1).   
The service profile is used for advertising and discovering services.  It consists of three types 
of information: a description of service and service provider, the functional behaviour of the 
service and several functional attributes used for automated service selection [AGAR04a].  The 
process model provides a detailed description of a service's operation.  The two main components 
of the process model are process ontology and process control ontology.  Process ontology 
describes a service in terms of its inputs, output, preconditions, effects and possible sub-processes; 
process control ontology describes each process in terms of its state, including initial activation, 
execution and completion [AGAR04a]. The service grounding specifies how to interoperate with 
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a service via messages [OWL-S].  OWL-S is capable of providing comprehensive descriptions for 
features, workflows, operations and interactions of various Web services. 
 
Figure 5.1 OWL-S Ontology (based on Figure 1 in [OWL-S]) 
5.2.4 Ontology Languages 
Ontologies offer expressive, declarative, system independent languages for specifying richer 
semantic description of Web documents.  The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) developed a 
description logic-based Web Ontology Language (OWL) for defining and instantiating Web 
ontologies based on the Resource Decision Framework (RDF).  It is a revised version of the 
DAML+OIL Web ontology language. OWL is also an important component of Semantic Web 
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activities.  It has several advantages over conventional Web service description languages such as 
the Web Service Description Language (WSDL) [OWL-S]. 
● OWL, like all other Web ontology languages, is semantically richer.  
● OWL has more facilities for expressing meanings and semantics.  
● OWL can support advanced Web search, software agents and knowledge management. 
● OWL provides tools to reason and discover Web services. 
These advantages make OWL a suitable specification language for representing 
heterogeneous policies in Web environments. 
5.2.5 Ontologies for Semantic-Web Security 
5.2.5.1  Access Control Model for the Semantic Web 
Research on access control of Semantic Web services is still at its primary stage.  Qin and 
Atluri [QIN03] proposed an access control model for the Semantic Web that was capable of 
specifying and evaluating authorizations over concepts defined in ontologies.  The most important 
contribution of the paper was that it identified and categorized the semantic relationships among 
concepts, and provided propagation policies for authorizations. The conceptual level security 
policies were defined by subject, action, object and sign, which were similar to the subject-
operation-object paradigm used by traditional database security models (refer to section 3.1).   
The subjects are roles and privilege groups; the objects are the concepts annotated by ontologies; 
the actions can be “read”, “write” and “update”; and the signs indicate either positive or negative 
authorizations.  The security policies are represented in a Semantic Access Control language 
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(SACL) that is based on the Web Ontology Language (OWL), but also includes some new 
vocabulary for security concepts.  However, as we discussed in chapter 3 and chapter 4, the 
traditional subject-operation-object approach is unable to provide efficient access control for 
enterprise systems and Web service applications.  Moreover, this model cannot support complex 
access control policies involving constraints and sessions.   
5.2.5.2 Using Ontology to Describe Security Concepts  
Several papers [DENK03, AGAR04a] provided ontology-based semantic descriptions for 
security concepts like credential and Access Control List (ACL). Credentials are digitally signed 
documents that specify granted capability for a service or characteristics of the user.  Ontology-
based credentials can be used to match with ontology-based Web service descriptions, and to 
query and discover Web services.    
A DAML-S based security framework [DENK03] for semantic Web services proposed 
security-related ontologies to represent well-known security concepts such as credentials. These 
ontologies were used to describe security requirements and capabilities of web services, so that 
they could be exploited by an ontology reasoner and matched against agent requests.  Security 
ontologies were merged with the DAML-S ontology for Web services by defining two new 
properties for Web services, namely “securityRequirement” and “securityCapability” of type 
SecurityMechanism.  The integration of ontology-based security mechanisms with ontology-
based Web services was designed to provide security brokerage between agents and services.  An 
important contribution of this paper is that it proposes an ontology-based security framework that 
integrates various existing security related standards, and addresses general security mechanisms 
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without redefining all the details for specific implementation choices.  This approach enables 
interoperability among heterogeneous platforms, and it provides a formalism for agents to reason 
about appropriate Web services. Moreover, DAML-S is extensible so that new components and 
concepts can be easily integrated into the existing framework.  However, the security mechanisms 
discussed in this paper were mainly used to match user requests with the appropriate Web 
services and to provide authentication using a credential ontology.  The security ontologies are 
designed to describe the communication level security framework such as security protocols like 
XKMS and security standards like WS-Security. They have not provided specifications for high-
level security policies like SoD and policy models like RBAC.   
Agarwal et al. [AGAR04a] provided a credential-based access control for Semantic Web 
services using DAML-S and Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI)/Single Distributed Security 
Infrastructure (SDSI).  As mentioned in section 5.2.3, DAML-S is an ontology for describing 
Web services with the objective of making Web services computer interpretable.  SPKI/SDSI is a 
public-key infrastructure suitable for providing credentials for Web service access control.  In this 
framework, the specification of access control policies together with user credentials can be 
expressed in a unified manner by DAML-S.  A Web service is described as a process ontology in 
which access control policy is defined as the preconditions of the process and credentials are 
defined as the input to the process.  The access control policies are based on Access Control Lists 
(ACL). By combining DAML-S and SPKI/SDSI, this framework is able to automate access 
control decision making based on credentials provided by an independent trust structure and 
described by an ontology.  However, this paper only provided a semantic description of 
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credentials without providing a comprehensive ontology-based description for all security 
concepts involved in Web service access control such as sessions and constraints.   Furthermore, 
the proposed framework relies on traditional ACLs for access control.  However, ACL is unable 
to model a variety of security policies and security concepts in a heterogenous Web environment.   
5.2.5.3 Using Ontologies for Policy Representation  
Semantic discrepancies pose serious challenges to access control of Web services as they 
prohibit information sharing among different services.  A number of papers have proposed formal 
policy representation frameworks to resolve semantic discrepancies between security policies in a 
Web environment.  Some important requirements for a policy representation framework are 
identified in [CLEM05].  
● A policy framework needs to provide unambiguous description of the terms and concepts, 
and the meaning of a policy written in this language is independent of its particular 
implementation. 
● A policy framework needs to be flexible and extensible to allow new types of policies to be 
added.  
● A policy framework should provide interoperability among different domains. 
XML-based policy frameworks were adopted by many people to specify security relevant 
information in distributed environments, since they provide uniform, vendor-neutral 
representations of enterprise data, and allow information sharing across heterogeneous systems 
[BHAT05].   Two important XML specification languages are the Security Assertions Markup 
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Language (SAML) and the XML Access Control Language (XACML). SAML is mainly 
designed for authentication purposes, whereas XACML is intended for Web-based authorization. 
XACML provides access control specification, supporting assignment of privileges according to 
user credentials and context information.  However, “XML can only provide surface syntax for 
contextual information, and imposes no semantic constraints on the meaning of the content” 
[OWLa].  SAML and XACML are unable to resolve semantic discrepancies between different 
security services.   Ontologies have been used for knowledge representation in many areas of the 
computer science.   Recently, a number of attempts were made to use ontology as a formal 
specification tool for Web service policies, such as KAoS (a policy and domain service 
framework) [USZO03], Rei (a policy specification language, “Rei” is a Japanese word meaning 
universal or essence) [KAGA03], and Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) [SWRL04].  These 
policy specification frameworks have provided specification, management, conflict resolution and 
enforcement of deontic-logic-based policies for services, agents, tasks and even concepts of rights, 
prohibitions, obligations, and dispensations.  They have provided vocabularies for describing 
security policies using semantic languages.  However, none of the above policy representation 
frameworks provided comprehensive semantic for describing application-level access control and 
access control models.    
5.2.6 Summary of Existing Work 
As an integral part of the Semantic Web, ontologies and ontology languages provide semantic 
representation and reasoning ability. A number of security frameworks have recently started to 
use ontologies for describing security concepts, security policies and security mechanisms related 
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to the Semantic Web.  Qin and Atluri [QIN03] provided a conceptual model for the Semantic 
Web.  This model was based on the subject-action-object paradigm and employed a Semantic 
Access Control Language (SACL).  The subject-operation-object paradigm, discussed in chapter 
3, has some drawbacks in terms of security management, and it cannot support complex security 
policies.  A number of papers have provided ontological descriptions of security concepts and 
security mechanisms to support semantic Web services. Security ontologies were developed to 
represent well-known security concepts like credentials and Access Control Lists (ACL), and they 
were integrated with DAML-S ontology for Web services to provide security brokering between 
agents and services [DENK03, AGAR04a].  Such integration have provided the reasoning ability 
for access control decision making, and allowed policies to be specified in a unified framework.  
Both papers focused on communication-level security services.  Ontology has also been used in 
formal policy representation frameworks, such as KAoS [USZO03], Rei [KAGA03], and SWRL 
[SWRL04].  These policy specification frameworks provided vocabularies for describing security 
policies using semantic languages.  
The above work has provided ontological descriptions for security concepts, security policies 
and security mechanisms that are related to the Semantic Web.  However, the security 
mechanisms provided in these papers are either for lower level security services or are inadequate 
to model complex access control scenarios at the application level.  Currently, there is no 
comprehensive model that provides application-level access control for semantic Web services.  
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5.3 Ontology-based RBAC for Semantic Web Services (OB-ERBAC) 
This section presents an Ontology-based Extended Role-based Access Control model for 
Semantic Web Services (OB-ERBAC).  This model provides ontology-based semantic 
descriptions for ERBAC models in order to bridge the gap between security services and the 
Semantic Web and facilitate automatic reasoning during access control.   
5.3.1 Motivation 
The development of the Semantic Web has attracted much attention, since it offers common 
machine-understandable semantics for describing Web content, and allows data to be shared and 
automatically processed by different services.  Ontology plays an important role in terms of 
providing formal syntax and semantics for Web service descriptions.  However, existing access 
control models are not suitable for Semantic Web services, since they do not provide compatible 
security frameworks for semantic Web resources.  For example, XML-based access control 
models for Web services, like X-RBAC [BHAT03a, BHAT03b] and X-GRBAC [BHAT04b], 
provide limited semantics for describing the security concepts and mechanisms involved in Web 
service access control.  Qin and Atluri [QIN03] argued that when applied to the Semantic Web, 
existing XML-based access control models should be elevated into a higher layer of the Semantic 
Web architecture, such as the Resource Description Framework (RDF) and ontologies, since 
access control for the Semantic Web is dependent on the semantic relationships among concepts. 
These semantic relationships are represented by ontologies.  Therefore, it is necessary to develop 
an ontology-based access control model that provides semantic descriptions for security concepts, 
security policies and security mechanisms in order to comply with ontology-based Semantic Web 
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services.   This framework will also provide automatic reasoning ability to query and discover 
security-related information.  It is envisaged that when an ontology-based access control model is 
integrated with an ontology-based Semantic Web service, the unified framework will be able to 
provide highly automated access control.  
5.3.2 Security Ontologies for the Extended RBAC Model  
5.3.2.1 Analysis of the Extended RBAC Model 
In this chapter, we will apply ontology techniques to the Extended Role-based Access 
Control (ERBAC) model proposed in chapter 4 for Semantic Web services.  ERBAC has several 
important advantages that make it a suitable access control model for Semantic Web services.   
As shown in chapter 4, ERBAC is capable of handling dynamic and anonymous users and 
reducing security management tasks.  ERBAC also supports a variety of access control policies 
and provides fine-grained access control for Web service applications such as controlling 
parameters of the user request.  However, in order to develop a semantically compatible access 
control model for Semantic Web services, it is necessary to provide ontological representations 
for the concepts and relations involved in the ERBAC model.   
The basic concepts involved in ERBAC are user capability/user request, role, permission, 
session, constraint, user-role assignment and permission-role assignment.  Each of these concepts 
can be represented by a separate ontology, and the aggregation of all these ontologies form the 
complete ontology-based ERBAC model.  Ontologies can be classified into different types such 
as process ontology, role-based ontology and service ontology, each serving different purposes as 
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explained in section 5.2.2.  The core of the ERBAC model is user-role assignment that ultimately 
determines access control outcomes.  The user-role assignment can be represented by a process 
ontology which is described in terms of input, output, precondition and result.   Another 
important relationship, permission-role assignment, defines which roles have what privileges.  It 
differs to user-role assignment, as the latter is dynamic and are depend on a variety of conditions, 
whereas permission-role assignment is predefined by system administrators, and used to provide 
access control policies for the user-role assignment process.  Thus, permission-role assignment 
can be represented by a policy ontology.    
5.3.2.2 Vocabulary and Symbols Used in the Model 
Since OWL and OWL-S provide a vocabulary to describe profiles and processes for Web 
services, some of their vocabulary can also be used for our ontology-based access control model.  
Each component of the ERBAC model, such as user and role, can be represented by the term 
Class which is an OWL term.  These security components (classes) are linked together by using 
the term ObjectProperty (OWL term).  The attributes of the security components are described as 
DatatypePropery (OWL term).  All properties will have domain (OWL term) and range (OWL 
term): the domain specifies the owner of the property, whereas the range specifies the target of 
the property. The term subClassOf (OWL term) is used to specify that a security component, a 
class, is a subclass of another security component (class), hence it inherits all the properties of the 
latter.   We define a set of symbols to represent the above mentioned terms and relations as 
depicted in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Symbols Used in the Security Ontologies 
A predefined class means this class has been defined by other ontologies in the model.  By 
using OWL and OWL-S vocabulary, our ontology-based ERBAC model has been made 
compatible with the Semantic Web.   
5.3.2.3 Policy Ontology and Process Ontology 
Three different types of security ontologies are defined in the specification of the ERBAC 
ontology: general security ontology, access control policy ontology and access control process 
ontology.   General security ontology describes the features and functionality of a security-related 
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object such as user, role, session and permission.  Access control policy ontology and access 
control process ontology have more complex properties.  Their unique features are described 
below.    
● Access Control Policy Ontology 
  In general, access control policy can be seen as a subclass of a policy ontology. A policy 
ontology defines a vocabulary for representing security and privacy policies and a description 
logic based mechanism for reasoning about the defined policies [CHEN04].   An access control 
policy may be described as a security subject being permitted or denied access to a particular 
security object with a particular operation.  The proposed access control policy ontology is 
influenced by the existing policy ontologies like Rei [KAGA03] and SOUPA [CHEN04].  It can 
be described with a tuple of four elements (security subject, operation, security object, sign) as 
shown in Figure 5.3.   
 
Figure 5.3 Access Control Policy Ontology 
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In the ERBAC model, we only consider whether or not a user can access a particular Web 
service or a particular A-function, so the operation will always be “has access to”, and the sign is 
always positive since a closed world policy is adopted.  Therefore, these two elements do not 
need to be explicitly specified; However, in most of the other access control models, operations 
(or access type, access mode) are specified, such as “read”, “write” or “modify; and signs can be 
either positive or negative for positive authorizations and negative authorizations respectively.  In 
order to provide a generic access control policy ontology, we will include operations and signs. 
● Access Control Process Ontology 
An access control process can be seen as a subclass of the process ontology.  OWL-S 
provides vocabulary for a process ontology using its process model.  Hence, the access control 
policy ontology shown in Figure 5.4 will be described in OWL-S vocabularies.   
 
Figure 5.4 Access Control Process Ontology 
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OWL-S describes a process model with the following properties: hasInput, hasOutput, 
hasPrecondition and hasResult.  On top of the OWL-S properties, the access control process 
ontology will have a unique property called “basedOnAlgorithm” with range “access control 
algorithm”. The access control algorithms specify how access control is carried out, and they are 
described with logic expressions like “if-then-else” and “while” loops.  These algorithms take the 
inputs and preconditions and produce output and results.  The specification of these properties 
varies from one access control model to the other.  However, the result of the access control 
process will always be either access granted or access denied. 
5.3.3 Component Ontologies for the Extended RBAC Model 
In this section, we will provide separate ontologies for each component in the ERBAC model 
based on the definition given in section 4.3.2.1 and the ontologies provided in section 5.3.2.   
● Security-focused Web service Ontology and A-function Ontology 
The description of Web service ontology will be based on the definition provided in the 
ERBAC model.  In the ERBAC model, a Web service is considered as a security object assigned 
to roles and accessed by users.    Therefore, the proposed Web service ontology will only involve 
security-related aspects.  A Web service contains a set of properties that distinguishes one Web 
service from others such as service name, service type and Authorization-function (A-function).  
Each Web service consists of a set of A-functions to carry out designated tasks.  A security-
focused Web service ontology is depicted as in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5 Web Service Ontology 
An Authorization-function (A-function) is a function exposed by an application interface to 
the outside world in order to execute certain user requests.  An A-function is regarded as the basic 
unit of access control, and it is also a type of security object.  An A-function is a part of a Web 
service, but it can also be represented as a separate ontology because of its importance.   
An A-function has the following properties: name, type, operation, resource, weight, input 
parameter and output parameter as shown in Figure 5.6.  A-function type specifies the types of A-
functions in terms of the classification method.  For instance, an A-function type may be 
determined by the purpose of an A-function.  Each A-function performs one or more operations 
on back-end resources, therefore can be represented by operation and resource.   An A-function 
has a set of input parameters and a set of output parameters for taking user input and outputting 
the result of execution.   
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Each A-function is assigned a weight indicating its security importance.  “Weight” can be 
derived in different ways.  The conventional way is based on the importance of the Authorization-
functions.  In general, an authorization-function updating or modifying the content of databases or 
files will be given the highest security protection, and hence will have more weight than an 
authorization-function reading from or writing to databases or files.  However, there is no single 
way of defining “weights”.  It always depends on the actual application.  Input parameter and 
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output parameter can be described by separate classes, and they are both subclasses of class 
parameter.  Class parameter has the following attributes: parameter name, parameter type and 
parameter value.  Input parameters and output parameters inherit all three attributes. 
Figure 5.6 Authorization-Function Ontology 
● User Capability Ontology and User Request Ontology  
 In ERBAC model, user-role assignment is no longer performed between user and role.  
Instead, roles are assigned to user capability or user request dynamically. User capability 
indicates what security objects can be accessed by a particular user.  It can be described in the 
form of subject-operation-object.  We will describe user capability as an access control policy 
ontology, which describes an access control policy using a tuple of four elements (Security 
subject, Operation, Security object, Sign) (Figure 5.7).  User capability is provided by a user 
credential, so it may be described as a property of user credential.  User credentials may also have 
some other properties related to network-level security services such as PKI certificate and 
certificate issuer [DENK03, AGAR04a]. However, we are focusing on application-level access 
control, low-level security services and security concepts will not be discussed here.  
A User request is made towards a particular A-function. It has the properties “requester”, 
“target” and “input”.  The requester can be represented by a credential ID, since each user is 
represented by a credential; the target refers to the requested A-function that will use the input 
parameters (Figure 5.8). 
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Figure 5.7 User Capability Ontology 
 
Figure 5.8 User Request Ontology 
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● Role Ontology    
Roles represent the privileges of users within an organization. They bring together users with 
permissions in the ERBAC model.  A role is assigned with property “role name”, “role type”, 
“weight”, “senior role” and “junior role” (Figure 5.9).  Role type can be either capability role or 
request role, depending on whether the role is mapped to a user capability or a user request.  The 
weight of the role is the total weight of permissions assigned to this role.  A role is associated 
with users and permissions via user-role assignment and permission-role assignment respectively.  
Role inheritance is an important relation in the ERBAC model.  In the role ontology, it is 
specified by using the property senior role and junior role.  If one role is specified as the senior 
role of another then it will inherit all properties of the junior role, whereas if one role is specified 
as the junior role of another role, then all its properties will be inherited by the senior role.   
 
Figure 5.9 Role Ontology 
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● Permission-role Assignment  
Permission-role assignment specifies which role has the permission to access what resources.  
In fact, it provides predefined access control policies.  Therefore, permission-role assignment can 
be represented by an access control policy ontology.  It defines access control policies using a 
tuple of four elements (security subject, security object, operation, sign) as shown in Figure 5.10.   
 
Figure 5.10 Permission-Role Assignment Ontology 
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The security subject will be a role.  Operation is always “hasAccessTo” in the ERBAC model.  
A sign can be either positive or negative depending on what security policy is used.  Security 
object can be any type of protected resource, such as a Web service or an A-function.   
● Constraint Ontology 
Constraints are conditions that must be satisfied when authorizations are granted. They are 
used to describe different security policies.  A constraint has a number of properties including 
constraint name, constraint type, constraint target and constraint purpose as shown in Figure 5.11.   
 
Figure 5.11 Constraint Ontology 
Constraint type can be A-function attribute constraint, environmental constraint or history-
dependent constraint as explained in section 3.3.3.1.  Constraint target indicates what the 
constraint is imposed on. For example, constraints may be imposed on user-role assignment.  
Constraint purpose tells what the constraint is used for, such as precondition or obligation.  
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Preconditions must be satisfied before any action is taken, such as granting an access right to a 
user.  Obligations are rules that must be followed in an action, they constrain the way a request is 
executed.   Constraints can be imposed on any concepts in the RBAC model.  There are currently 
many different types of constraints, such as separation of duty (SoD), cardinality, time and 
location. Each of them has a unique structure.  Developing different types of constraint ontologies 
can be important future research work. 
● Session Ontology  
A Session refers to the set of events that occurs from when a user connects to an 
application/system to when that user disconnects from it. A session ontology represents the 
profile of a particular session.   
 
Figure 5.12 Session Ontology 
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Session profiles record all events that happened in each session, and they can be described by 
a number of parameters.  These parameters are often dynamic, as they change with time.  The 
session ontology represents all these parameters as properties. Session properties can vary from 
one system to another. The common properties are start time, end time, location, activity record 
and system status (Figure 5.12).  A session ontology is linked with user ontology, role ontology, 
Web service ontology, A-function ontology and constraint ontology.  It provides a variety of 
security conditions for supporting dynamic role assignment.   
● User-role Assignment Ontology  
User-role assignment (or simply role assignment) is the most important part of the ERBAC 
model, since it is used as the access control decision-making engine in role-based security 
systems. The system architecture is depicted in Figure 5.16.   User-role assignment matches user 
capabilities or user requests with appropriate roles, and decides whether or not an access is 
granted.  According to the ERBAC model, the user-ole assignment, as discussed in section 4.3.3, 
relies on three essential factors: user capability/user request, permission-role assignment and 
constraint.  User-role assignment is also dependent on the role assignment algorithms.  We 
provided two role assignment algorithms in section 4.3. These two algorithms are fed with the 
above-mentioned three essential factors of role assignment to produce a matching role as output.  
They are described in the user-role assignment ontology.   
In this model, user-role assignment will be represented by an access control process ontology.  
The access control process can be seen as a subclass of process.  A process ontology defines input, 
output, constraints, relationships, terms, and sequencing information relevant to a particular 
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business process or a set of processes.  OWL-S provides a vocabulary for describing service 
profiles and service processes.  We will use some of the vocabulary provided in OWL-S to 
describe the user-role assignment process (Figure 5.13).   
 
Figure 5.13 User-Role Assignment Ontology 
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According to the definition provided in section 4.3.2, user capability/user request and 
permission-role assignment are described as the input to the process, and constraints imposed on 
the user-role assignment are described as the preconditions of the process.  The process of 
deriving an access control decision relies on the role assignment algorithms.  We describe it by 
using a new property called “basedOnAlgorithm” that has range “role assignment algorithm”.  
The algorithms will now take user capability, user request and constraints as inputs, to produce a 
matching role; they are referred as Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in section 4.3.3.  Since OWL-S 
provides vocabulary for describing logic expressions, we will describe role assignment with an 
OWL vocabulary.  The output of the process is a matching role for each user capability/user 
request.   The result will be an access control decision, either access granted or access denied. 
5.3.4 Ontology-based Web Service Access Control  
5.3.4.1 Full ERBAC Ontology and its Integration with Web Service Ontology 
The complete ERBAC ontology shown in Figure 5.14 is formed by aggregating all 
component ontologies.  These separate security ontologies are linked together by defining one 
ontology as the property of another.  Once the relationship between different components of the 
model is formalized with ontologies, security reasoning becomes possible. We will be able to 
query and discover the required security information. Having all required security conditions 
available, the complete ERBAC ontology is able to generate access control decisions 
automatically.   
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Figure 5.14 The Complete ERBAC Ontology 
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precondition of the Web service ontology defined in OWL-S [OWL-S], since it must be satisfied 
for a Web service request to be processed.  In OWL-S, the property “precondition” is defined to 
have range “condition”. We will provide a subclass “access control condition” to represent this 
type of ontology so that security ontologies can be integrated with Web service ontologies as 
shown in Figure 5.15. 
 
Figure 5.15 The Integration of ERBAC Ontology and Web Service Ontology 
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5.3.4.2 An Ontology-based Access Control System 
In this section, we will establish an access control system that provides security mechanisms 
for Semantic Web services.  These security mechanisms implement the proposed ontology-based 
ERBAC model and provide access control at the application level.  The main components of the 
system are described as the following:  
● Web service tier: this layer contains access control mechanisms and security data repositories. 
● Web service requester:  the agent (user) who makes the request to access a particular Web 
service or an A-function of a Web service.  Web service requesters are represented by their 
credentials (user capability). 
● Session Manager: it records the session history and session related parameters. It also 
provides session information related to the semantic policy repository.  
● Ontology-based Access Decision Engine: this module makes access decisions based on the 
ontology-based ERBAC model (Figure 5.14) and the policies stored in a semantic policy 
repository. 
● Access Enforcement Module: this module executes the result produced by the access control 
decision engine.  If a request is granted, the access enforcement engine will fetch the user 
requested data from the back-end resource repository.  
● Access Control Policy Base: stores security policies represented in ontology-based semantic 
language. 
● Back-end Resource Repository:   it can be a collection of data repositories.   
This system architecture is depicted in Figure 5.16. 
CHAPTER 5. AN ONTOLOGY-BASED ACCESS CONTROL MODEL FOR SEMANTIC WEB 
SERVICES 
138
 
 
Figure 5.16 An Access Control System Architecture for Semantic Web Services  
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the semantic policy base (SPB).  The result of an access control decision is presented to the 
enforcement module that allows or denies the user access to Semantic Web services.   
5.4 Implementation 
5.4.1 A Web-based Bookstore Management System 
In this section, we present a Web-based bookstore management system used to test the 
proposed model.  This system provides two Web services: Customer Management and Book 
Order. Customer management provides users with functions to manage customer records.   A 
customer record stores customer ID, customer name, address, telephone number and credit limit. 
Each Web service consists of a number of authorization-functions (A-functions).  Web service 
“customer management” consists of the following A-functions: 
● Customer searchCustomerByID(int cust_id)  
● Customer[] searchCustomerByName(String cust_name)  
● int insertCustomer(Customer newCust)  
● String requestCreditUpdate(Customer cust, int newCreditLimit, int pid)  
● CustomerCredit[] getAllCreditUpdateRequest()      
● String approveCreditUpdate(int pid) 
● CustomerCredit[] getAllApprovedUpdateRequest()  
● String updateCreditLimit(CustomerCredit cust)  
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Each of these A-functions is used to perform a particular user request. They are the basic unit 
of access control in the proposed model.  
5.4.2 System Architecture 
In this section, we will introduce the basic components of the bookstore system.  The system 
is implemented by the following client/server model.   
● User Interface (UI) – UI provides client side support by interacting with users 
● Web Server – provides Web services to users of the system.  It contains access control 
mechanisms for a Web service.   
● Composite (CS) Server – integrates functions from different applications.  It encapsulates 
business logic and exchanges data with a number of database servers.  
● Database (DB) server – provides access to different database resources.   
● Database (DB) – stores data and resources. 
● Access Control Enforcement Module (ACE) Module – presented in Figure 5.16, is 
implemented by a list of A-functions specified in section 5.4.1.  These A-functions are the 
only channels to access back-end resources.  
● Access Control Decision (ACD) Engine – provides access control mechanisms that use 
dynamic role assignment.  This module implements dynamic role assignment as described in 
Figure 5.13. 
● Ontology Interpreter – interpret ontology-based resources  
● Access Control (AC) Policy Base– stores semantic security information specified in OWL  
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● Session Manager – records session related parameters, such as session start time, session end 
time and activities conducted in the current session.  These parameters may be used for time-
related or history-dependent access control.   
Figure 5.17 presents the bookstore system that is derived from the system architecture 
presented in Figure 5.16. 
 
Figure 5.17 A Bookstore Access Control System 
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Except for database and access control policy base, all the above-mentioned components are 
implemented in Java (JBuilder 9).  The Web server is developed using the J2EE application 
server package.  Databases are implemented by Oracle 9 including a Customer Information table. 
Access control policy base consists of several OWL files, such as Constraint.RDF, 
PR_Assignment.RDF, Web_Service.RDF.  Session manager records the user activities in the 
current session in OWL files like Auditing.RDF.  Communication between Web server, CS server 
and DB server is achieved via Remote Procedure Invocation (RMI).    
5.4.3 Examples of Ontology-based Access Control 
In this section, we will show how the proposed ontology-based model can be used to control 
a credit approval process.  The operation involves two clerks and an accountant.  The process 
starts when a clerk makes a request to update the credit limit of a particular customer.  An 
accountant, upon receiving the request, will need to approve the credit update request in order to 
continue this process.  Once the credit update request is approved, a different clerk will finalize 
the process by updating the credit limit of the customer in the system.     
The access control process is based on the role assignment ontology illustrated in Figure 5.13.  
Role assignment ontology is implemented by the Access Control Decision (ACD) Engine shown 
in Figure 5.17.  The inputs of the role assignment ontology include the user capability ontology, 
the user request ontology and the permission-role assignment ontology. Role assignment ontology 
is also restricted by the constraint ontology as the precondition.  In the implemented system, these 
ontologies are specified by the files User_Capability.RDF, PR_Assignment.RDF, constraint.RDF 
respectively.  They are implemented in OWL and are stored in an access control policy base. User 
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requests are user inputs to the system.  Hence, they will be shown through several screen shots.   
The core of the role assignment ontology is the role assignment algorithm.  Role assignment 
algorithms make access control decisions according to various inputs and preconditions.  We will 
use the two role assignment algorithms specified in chapter 4 (section 4.3.3.3 and section 4.3.3.4) 
for this system.  They are used to map user capability and user requests to corresponding roles 
and to make access control decisions.  The outputs of the role assignment ontology are roles that 
allow users to fulfil their requests.  The result of the role assignment ontology is either 
authorization granted or authorization denied.  
In the access control process, constraint specifies conditions that must be satisfied before or 
during dynamic role assignment.  To ensure there is no conflict of interest and prevent potential 
frauds, we will impose constraints “separation of duty” and “workflow” on the access control 
process.  The “separation of duty” constraint makes A-functions “requestCreditUpdate”, 
“approveCreditUpdate” and “updateCreditLimit” mutually exclusive of each other.   The 
“workflow” constraint assigns an order number to each step of the update credit limit process 
which indicates the process that needs to be executed in exact orders.  An example of 
Constraint.RDF is shown below.   
Constraint.RDF (part) 
  <con:ME_Function ID = "ME1"> 
 <con:hasMEFunction rdf:resource = "requestCreditUpdate"/> 
 <con:hasMEFunction rdf:resource = "approveCreditUpdate"/> 
 <con:hasMEFunction rdf:resource = "updateCreditLimit"/> 
  </con:ME_Function> 
  <con:Work_Flow ID = "WF1"> 
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 <con:hasWFFunction rdf:resource = "requestCreditUpdate"> 
  <con:Order>1</con:Order> 
 </con:hasWFFunction> 
 <con:hasWFFunction rdf:resource = "approveCreditUpdate"> 
  <con:Order>2</con:Order> 
 </con:hasWFFunction> 
 <con:hasWFFunction rdf:resource = "updateCreditLimit"> 
  <con:Order>3</con:Order> 
 </con:hasWFFunction> 
  </con:Work_Flow> 
Another important access control factor is the permission-role assignment relationship which 
is predefined by system administrators.  File PR_Assignment.RDF specifies what A-functions are 
accessible to each role.      
PR_Assignment.RDF (part) 
 <rd:PR_Assignment rdf:ID = "1"> 
  <rd:SecuritySubject rdf:resource = "System_User"> 
         <rd:SecurityObject rdf:resource= "searchBookByID"/> 
 </rd:PR_Assignment> 
 ....... 
 <rd:PR_Assignment rdf:ID = "8"> 
  <rd:SecuritySubject rdf:resource = "Employee"> 
         <rd:SecurityObject rdf:resource= "searchCustomerByID"/> 
      </rd:PR_Assignment> 
 ....... 
 <rd:PR_Assignment rdf:ID = "10"> 
  <rd:SecuritySubject rdf:resource = "Accountant"> 
         <rd:SecurityObject rdf:resource= "approveCreditUpdate"/> 
      </rd:PR_Assignment> 
 ....... 
 <rd:PR_Assignment rdf:ID = "14"> 
  <rd:SecuritySubject rdf:resource = "Clerk"> 
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         <rd:SecurityObject rdf:resource= "requestCreditUpdate"/> 
      </rd:PR_Assignment> 
 <rd:PR_Assignment rdf:ID = "15"> 
  <rd:SecuritySubject rdf:resource = "Clerk"> 
         <rd:SecurityObject rdf:resource= "updateCreditLimit"/> 
      </rd:PR_Assignment> 
 ....... 
For example, a user Wei logs into the system and carries the following user capability: 
User_Capability.RDF (part) 
 <User_Capability rdf:ID = "CI3"> 
  <SecuritySubject rdf:resource = "Wei"/> 
  <SecurityObject rdf:resource = "searchCustomerByID"/> 
         <SecurityObject rdf:resource= "searchCustomerByName"/> 
  <SecurityObject rdf:resource= "insertCustomer"/> 
  <SecurityObject rdf:resource= "requestCreditUpdate"/> 
         <SecurityObject rdf:resource= "updateCreditLimit"/> 
 </User_Capability >  
Wei’s user capability is mapped to the role “clerk” according to the algorithm user capability 
to role assignment (Algorithm 1 in section 4.3.3.3).  Role “clerk” is a capability role which 
indicates that all privileges can be exercised by the user in this session.  This will give Wei the 
privileges to make a credit update request and to update the approved credit request.  A 
personalised user interface is displayed according to the user capability (Figure 5.18).   Only A-
functions that are accessible to the user will be activated on the Graphic User Interface (GUI). 
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Figure 5.18 Personalized Web Service 1 
 The proposed model follows the strict least privileged principle in access control.  Hence, 
each request made by the user will be assigned to a request role (Algorithm 2 in section 4.3.2.4) 
that has just enough privilege to access the requested A-function.  For example, when the A-
function searchCustomerByID() is accessed, the request role for this particular request will be the 
role “employee” according to PR_Assignment.RDF.  When Wei makes a request to update the 
credit limit of a customer “John Smith”, for example from 1000 to 2000 (refer to Figure 5.18), it 
is assigned to the role “clerk” since it is the least privileged role to access A-function 
requestCreditUpdate() (refer to PR_Assignment.RDF).  If Wei then tries to update the credit limit 
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himself, he will get the message “Authorization Denied” due to the mutual exclusion defined in 
the ME_Function node of Constraint.RDF.  The Auditing.RDF file is a part of the activity record 
controlled by the session manager.  It records all A-functions executed in a particular session.  
The Auditing.RDF consists of access records. Each of these access records stores the A-function 
accessed (FNAME); the role used to access the particular A-function (RNAME), the process ID 
(PID) indicates an A-function can be a part of a process, and the session identification number 
(SID).   
Auditing.RDF 
<AUDIT_TRAIL> 
 ....... 
<ACCESS_RECORD ID = “2”> 
<FNAME rdf:resource = "requestCreditUpdate"/>  
<RNAME rdf:resource = "Clerk"/> 
<PID rdf:resource ="1"/> 
<SID rdf:resource ="25"/> 
 <ACCESS_RECORD/> 
 ....... 
</AUDIT_TRAIL> 
The file updateCreditLimit.RDF is designed to record the status of the update credit limit 
process.  It is part of the activity records controlled by the session manager.  User requests of 
different A-functions will have different properties.  According to user request ontology depicted 
in Figure 5.8, the user request has three properties: credential ID (CID), A-function ID (FID) and 
input parameters (Customer_ID, current_credit and new credit) of the A-function. 
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updateCreditLimit.RDF 
 <CreditUpdate ID ="1"> 
<CID rdf:resource = "Wei"/> 
<FID rdf:resource = "updateCreditLimit"/> 
<CUSTOMER_ID rdf:resource = "John Smith"/> 
<CURRENT_CREDIT rdf:resource ="1000"/> 
<NEW_CREDIT rdf:resource ="2000"/> 
<STATUS rdf:resource ="requested"/> 
<PID rdf:resource ="1"/> 
<SID rdf:resource = "25"/> 
</CreditUpdate> 
The second step of the update credit limit process is to approve the update request.  For 
example, another user, Peter logs into the system carrying the following user capability.  
 <User_Capability rdf:ID = "CI1"> 
  <SecuritySubject rdf:resource = "Peter"/> 
  <SecurityObject rdf:resource= "searchCustomerByID"/> 
         <SecurityObject rdf:resource= "searchCustomerByName"/> 
  <SecurityObject rdf:resource= "approveCreditUpdate"/> 
 </User_Capability> 
This user capability is mapped to role accountant.  A different instance of the Web service 
(see Figure 5.19) is activated according to Peter’s user capability.  The role “accountant” has the 
privilege to load the credit update requests and approve it if the claim is valid.  The Auditing.RDF 
and updateCreditLimit.RDF record the activity in this session.  They are similar to the ones 
presented above, but this time, the “STATUS” attribute in updateCreditLimit.RDF is changed to 
“approved”.  
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Once the credit update request is approved, another user Jim, who has the same user 
capability as Wei, is mapped to the role “clerk”.  Jim can then load the approved request and 
execute the credit update function. The “STATUS” attribute in updateCreditLimit.RDF is 
changed to “updated”, indicating that the credit update process has concluded.  
 
Figure 5.19 Personalized Web Service 2 
In the whole process, the workflow constraint ensures all the steps are followed in the exact 
order defined in the Work_Flow node of Constraint.RDF.  The clerk who updated the credit limit 
has to be a different person to the clerk who requested the credit update according to 
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ME_Function node of Constraint.RDF.  This example illustrates how the ontology-based model 
can be used to provide access control for Web-based systems at the application level.   
5.4.4 System, Language and Performance 
Our bookstore system was tested on three PCs all running Windows 2000.  Each computer 
had 512M RAM and an AMD Athlon XP 2600 processor.  The three computers formed a TCP/IP 
based distributed system.  Installation of the system took about 200KB hard disk space for each 
computer.  Since the proposed model is ontology-based, it can be used on any platform that has 
an ontology interpreter.  This makes it a suitable model for large-scale enterprise systems 
consisting of heterogeneous applications.  In the bookstore system, the model was implemented in 
the Java language to make use of Java’s enhanced security features, such as cryptography, public 
key infrastructure, secure communication, authentication, and access control, to complement the 
proposed model.   Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) and Java Messaging Service (JMS) 
were used to exchange data between different terminals.  System performance was expected to be 
affected, as an additional step, namely data conversion between ontology language and XML (as 
described in 5.4) was carried out by an ontology interpreter during access control.  However, in 
the tests, this effect proved to be minimal.  The result indicates that the difference between 
running an operation with and without ontology interpreters is negligible (less than 0.01 second).  
However, when the proposed model is implemented in a large-scale enterprise system, the effects 
on system performance may be more noticeable due to the complexity and number of 
participating systems.  Therefore, it is important to find a balance between security and system 
performance when implementing the proposed ontology-based model.   
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5.5 Discussion and Future Work 
This chapter presented an ontology-based application-level access control model (OB-
ERBAC) for Semantic Web services.  In this model, ontology techniques were applied to 
Extended RBAC described in chapter 4 to provide interoperable and unambiguous descriptions 
for security services, security mechanisms and security policies that are in line with the Semantic 
Web.  These security-relevant ontologies were aggregated and then integrated with Web service 
ontology to provide automatic reasoning ability for access control decision making.  Since the 
OB-ERBAC model is based on ontology and uses vocabulary from OWL and OWL-S, it can be 
easily mapped to ontology languages such as OWL.  OWL and OWL-S are platform-independent 
and extensible semantic languages that allow the model to be implemented, extended and 
modified by different security services. The implementation of the bookstore access control 
system (section 5.4) proved that the proposed model is capable of supporting a variety of access 
control policies, such as SoD.   However, an ontology interpreter is required to process OWL 
specifications.  In order to utilize the full reasoning ability of ontologies, the ontology interpreter 
has to understand not only the semantics of all ontologies but the interrelationships between all 
ontologies.  It should be noted that as the ontology network continues to expand, the ontology 
interpreter will become increasingly difficult to implement.  Furthermore, ontology specifications 
are designed for computer processing, it is difficult for human users to interpret.  Its complex 
semantics make debugging and modification more difficult than the data stored in databases or in 
XML files.    
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The proposed model is only the first step towards a complete access control ontology.  One 
important aspect that has not been addressed in detail is the constraint ontologies.  Since there are 
many types of constraints, this research has not yet provided ontologies for different types of 
constraints.  The ontology-based approach is able to derive access control decisions automatically 
based on user capabilities provided in credentials and on the security requirements of the Web 
services.  However, this model has not provided automatic reasoning ability for additional 
security information required by Web services; for example, if a user credential has not provided 
adequate security information for the security requirements of a Web service, then the system will 
not be able to automatically query and discover the missing information.   
In the future, we may provide ontology descriptions for different types of constraints, and this 
may utilize the existing ontologies for time, person and policy.  Furthermore, it is necessary to 
develop an ontology-based access control language that provides formal representations for the 
concepts and the mechanisms involved in the OB-ERBAC model.  By connecting the role 
assignment process ontology to other security ontologies, such as credential ontologies specified 
in [DENK03, AGAR04a], the access control engine will be able to search and discover additional 
security information required by Web services.   By using ontology techniques, it will be possible 
to compose credentials that satisfy the security requirements of Web services in an automatic way. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter presented an ontology-based access control model for semantic Web services.  
An ontology-based specification framework was developed to provide semantic descriptions for 
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the Extended RBAC using a range of security ontologies.  These security ontologies can be used 
to specify access control policies and the role assignment process. The access control policy 
ontology was based on the subject-operation-object paradigm that described Web service and A-
function as the security objects, and users and roles as the security subjects.  The role assignment 
ontology is the core component for realizing dynamic access control.  It used new vocabulary and 
vocabulary from OWL-S to describe dynamic role assignment.  User capability/user request, 
session, and permission-role assignment are described as the input to the process; constraints are 
described as preconditions of the process; the output of the process will be a least privileged role.  
These security ontologies were aggregated and integrated with Web service ontology to provide 
automatic reasoning ability for Web service access control.  Finally, a semantic access control 
system was developed that includes security mechanisms to process semantic security 
information and provides ontology-based access control for Web services.  A bookstore 
management system was implemented to test the proposed OB-ERBAC model.  The result shows 
that the OB-ERBAC can provide a unified access control framework for Web-based systems. 
However, the implementation of an ontology-based access control framework is more complex 
than the existing ones, since it needs to provide sophisticated mechanisms to interpret and utilize 
heterogeneous ontologies such as policy ontologies and process ontologies. 
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Chapter 6  
Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 Summary 
6.1.1 A Review of Research Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to provide application-level access control for enterprise-wide 
systems and Web services (Web-based enterprise systems).    This includes providing efficient 
and expressive, dynamic and fine-grained access control models to address subject heterogeneity 
and object heterogeneity in a distributed environment, and establishing a formal specification 
framework to represent security concepts in an unambiguous form.    
6.1.2 Achievements and Contributions 
In chapter 3, we developed an authorization-function-based access control (FB-RBAC) 
model for enterprise-wide systems. Chapter 4 presented an extension of the A-function access 
control model (ERBAC) aimed for Web services. ERBAC inherits all advantages of FB-RBAC.  
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Additionally, it utilizes credentials, environmental factors and predefined access control policies 
to achieve dynamic role assignment.  Chapter 5 proposed an Ontology-based ERBAC model 
(OB-ERBAC) for the semantic Web services.  Ontology is applied to the ERBAC model to 
provide semantic representations of access control policies and mechanisms.  The main 
contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
● Authorization-function-based (A-function) access control 
An A-function is regarded as the basic access control unit in all models presented in this 
thesis.  It provides a new access control paradigm for enterprise systems at the application level 
and complements various lower level security infrastructures.  The use of A-function simplifies 
security management, and enables efficient access control for generic enterprise applications.  A-
function-based access control also supports a variety of access control policies through the use of 
constraints, such as controlling the parameters of the A-function.    This allows the proposed 
model to express various access control scenarios, and provides content-based and fine-grained 
access control for enterprise systems. 
● Dynamic Role Assignment 
Dynamic role assignment is the core of the ERBAC model and of the OB-ERBAC model.  It 
assigns roles to users dynamically according to user capabilities provided at the time of the 
request, a variety of environmental factors and a set of predefined access control policies.   
Dynamic role assignment is designed for distributed environments where there are large numbers 
of subjects and objects.  The main contributions of dynamic role assignment is that it provides 
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credential-based access control that does not rely on user identities, and it allows access control 
decision making to be performed dynamically thus capturing changing environmental factors.   
● Ontology-based access control representation framework 
 The ontology-based access control representation framework aims to support Semantic Web 
services.  Security ontologies are developed to specify concepts and terms involved in access 
control.  This model can be easily mapped to the OWL access control specification language.  
The main contribution of the ontology-based framework is that it provides common access 
control framework that is inline with the Semantic Web.  The use of ontology provides reasoning 
ability for access control decision making, and allows access control information to be searched, 
queried and discovered automatically.  
6.1.3 Future Work 
This research has provided a foundation for access control frameworks in a Web-based 
environment.  Using ontology to represent security-related concepts is a new approach towards 
access control automation and policy specification. In the future, we may: 
● investigate different types of constraints and how they can be used to describe different 
access control scenarios,  
● investigate various types of security information carried by user credentials, and how they can 
be used for dynamic access control decision making, 
● ensure consistency between application-level access control service and lower level access 
control service, and 
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● provide ontology-based descriptions for a variety of constraints and a more detailed user 
credentials. 
The constraints discussed in the proposed model may be classified according to their nature, 
such as time constraints, location constraints, and environmental constraints.  They can be sub-
divided into more fine-grained constraints.  Each of these constraints may be described by a set of 
attributes.  The next step can then be to formalize these constraints using ontologies, so they can 
be utilized in the proposed ontology-based model. 
A user credential can carry more security information than just user capability.  For example, 
it may contain the location where user identity can be verified, or a variety of user attributes.   A 
user credential can be viewed as a security object that contains smaller security objects.  Each of 
these objects can be described by a variety of predefined attributes.   These security objects 
should be formally described by ontologies and used in the proposed access control model. 
An enterprise security framework provides enterprise-level access control on top of 
independent local security services. It is crucial that the entire enterprise system is presented in a 
uniform and consistent manner.  While authorization autonomy of the local system is maintained, 
enterprise security policies may contradict back-end security policies, in which cases conflict 
resolution is required.  Although researchers have studied this topic previously for distributed 
systems, none of them has taken an ontological approach in a Web service environment.  To 
make the proposed model more comprehensive, this issue should be addressed accordingly. 
Each of the constraints and user credential objects can be formally described by an ontology.  
These ontologies may be developed individually and connected to the access control process 
ontology when needed.  As a result, security constraints and security objects carried by user 
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credentials can be easily added to or removed from the network of access control ontologies.  
More importantly, the constraint ontologies and credential ontologies also contain links to other 
ontologies.  After adding some reasoning ability to the proposed model, it will be able to locate 
and fetch security information automatically during access control.   
6.2 Conclusion 
This thesis presents an authorization-function-based access control (FB-RBAC) model for 
enterprise systems.  The model extends the well-known RBAC96 [SAND96] model and adds 
some unique features, like Authorization-function-based access control and constraint-based fine-
grained access control, to the original model.  The basic unit of access control has changed from 
data items in the traditional access control models to Authorization-functions (A-functions) in 
FB-RBAC, since an A-function is a more efficient notion to represent permissions in 
authorization specifications.  The concept of constraint brought up in RBAC96 is also extended to 
describe a variety of access control policies in which some are used to provide fine-grained access 
control.  FB-RBAC is independent of any system architecture or implementation platform.  It can 
be applied to any type of enterprise system and is designed to provide access control at the 
application level.  This model should be implemented at the middle-tier of an enterprise system to 
complement the existing security services at the back-end.  FB-RBAC provides an overall 
security protection to integrate enterprise systems without interfering with existing security 
infrastructure in the participating applications.   
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FB-RBAC is then extended to support Web service applications (enterprise applications 
using Web services).  Web services can also be used as communication channels for data 
exchange across corporate boundaries.  However, to address the problem of user heterogeneity 
and dynamicity in the Web environment, some new features like credential-based access control 
and dynamic role assignment were added to FB-RBAC to form Extended RBAC (ERBAC) model.  
Credential-based access control is different from identity-based control employed by most of the 
traditional models using credentials, provided by trusted third parties and secured by encryption 
techniques like Public-key Infrastructure (PKI).  In ERBAC, role assignment was made dynamic 
according to user credentials, environmental conditions and a set of access control policies.  All 
of these aspects change frequently over time, hence making access control more flexible and 
dynamic.  On the other hand, dynamic role assignment also made security management more 
simple and efficient since it avoids the complexity of manually assigning huge number of access 
rights to a large number of subjects.  The ERBAC model has filled a gap in the area of Web 
service security as most of the Web security services were aimed at network level and designed to 
ensure communication security, there were no security services at the application level.   
The proposed ERBAC model has been further extended to support Semantic Web services.  
The Semantic Web was designed to be machine-interpretable and specified by ontologies.   This 
thesis applied ontology techniques to the ERBAC model to form an ontology-based ERBAC 
model. This model provides ontological specifications for all features of the ERBAC model.  
Since the Semantic Web is also based on ontologies, this specification framework would allow 
security services to be integrated with the Semantic Web by joining up security ontologies with 
ontologies designed for Semantic Web services such OWL-S.  In this unified framework, it will 
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be possible to query and discover access control information required for semantic Web security 
from a network of ontologies.   This is an important requirement for realizing automatic access 
control decision making.  However, both research in semantic Web and in ontology-based 
security services are still at their early stages.  The proposed model is only the first step towards a 
complete ontology-based access control model.  It is envisaged that the full version of the model 
will provide significant contributions to the research of access control.   
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